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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over this case under Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j). The Supreme Court is authorized to transfer this appeal to the 
Court of Appeals under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4). The Court of Appeals has 
appellate jurisdiction over this case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Because appellees are dissatisfied with appellants' Statement of Issues, they 
advance their own issues presented for review: 
Point LA - Does an appeal lie from a denial of a Motion for Summary Judgment? 
This is a question of law, which is reviewed for correctness. Hughes v. Cafferty, 2004 
UT22, 89P.3dl48. 
Point LB - If a Trial Court's ruling is based on multiple independent grounds and 
only one ground is the subject of appeal, should this Court affirm? This is a question of 
law, which is reviewed for correctness. Hughes v. Cafferty, 2004 UT 22, 89 P.3d 148. 
Point I.C and D - Should the Trial Court have treated Sykes Trust's affirmative 
defense as a counterclaim? This is a determination that by the terms of Rule 8(c), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, is reviewed based upon an abuse of discretion standard. E.g., 
Amoco Oil Co. v. Gomez, 379 F.3d 1266 (11th Cir. 2004), cert denied, 125 S. Ct. 1693 
(2005). 
Point II.A - Did the Trial Court apply the dispositive motion cutoff date to the 
detriment of appellants, and are appellants factually incorrect in claiming that the Trial 
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Court refused to entertain their Public Road Motion? Standards of review for case 
management issues is abuse of discretion. Rehn v. Rehn, 974 P.2d 306, 314 (UT App, 
1999). 
Point II.B - Did the Trial Court improperly refuse to allow defendants to amend 
their pleadings to state a counterclaim asserting the existence of a public road? The 
standard of review is abuse of discretion. R&R Energies v. Mother Earth Industries, 936 
P.2dl068, 1080 (Utah 1997). 
Point III.A - Are appellants precluded from challenging handwriting testimony 
because they never objected to that testimony at trial? This is a question of law. Hughes 
v. Cafferty, 2004 UT 22, 89 P.3d 148. 
Point HI.B - Did appellants fail to marshal the evidence on the issue whether 
Peterson was a "subscribing witness"? This is question of law. Hughes v. Cafferty, 
2004UT22, 89P.3dl48. 
Point III.C and D - Is the Trial Court's determination that Peterson was not a 
subscribing witness supported by the evidence? The standard of review is "clearly 
erroneous." Estate ofBartell, 116 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989). 
Point III.E and F - Do Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-2-10 and 14 preclude handwriting 
evidence in this case? This is a question of statutory interpretation reviewed for 
correctness. Anderson v. United Parcel Service, 2004 UT 57, 96 P.3d 903. 
Point IV - Did the Trial Court on summary judgment rule correctly that the 
Easement Document was invalid for lack of consideration? This determination, being 
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on summary judgment, is reviewed for correctness. Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 2003 
UT13, 73P.2d325. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
No such provisions apply to this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Because appellees are dissatisfied with appellants' Statement of the Case, they 
advance their own statement: 
Nature of the Case 
This action is between parties claiming interests in adjacent properties. Plaintiffs/ 
appellees initiated this action against Dwane J. Sykes ("Sykes"), Frontier International 
Land Corporation ("Frontier"), and the Trustees of the Sykes Trust, who were initially 
Benoy and Angela Tamang and later E. L. Roy Duce ("Sykes Trust") among others, 
seeking an adjudication that a written easement document (the "Easement Document") 
burdening plaintiffs' property was invalid and unenforceable on multiple grounds, 
including that the grantors' signatures were forged. The Complaint also sought damages 
based on slander of title and interference with economic relations arising from the 
wrongful recordation of the Easement Document. Defendants Sykes and Frontier 
counterclaimed seeking only (i) to establish an adverse possession claim against part of 
plaintiffs' property and (ii) to adjust the boundaries between the parties' properties 
based upon boundary by acquiescence. Sykes Trust answered but did not counterclaim. 
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Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
Plaintiffs filed this action against all parties having any record interest in the land 
purportedly benefitted by the forged Easement Document. The claims against those 
parties were resolved in three ways: 
Stipulations. Defendants Dennis Sykes, Mark Sykes, William Christiansen, 
University Avenue Associates, Patricia Sykes, and Allen Pack stipulated to orders 
providing that the Easement Document was not valid as to them. 
Defaults. Defendants Paul J. Young, Cottonwood Sundance Corporation, CSD 
Equities, and B. Diane George had default judgments entered against them (some after 
trial), which adjudicated that to the extent of their interest in the properties the Easement 
Document was void and that they were liable to plaintiffs for damages to the extent of 
their interests in the property. There is no appeal from these judgments. 
Contested Orders. The remainder of the defendants — Sykes, Sykes Trust, and 
Frontier — are appellants. The pertinent orders affecting them follow: 
On August 22, 2001, the District Court, the Honorable James R. Taylor presiding, 
entered an Order granting the separate Motions for Partial Summary Judgment of 
plaintiffs The Berkshires ("Berkshires"), on the one hand, and Pepjaans I, Peaco, Ltd., 
and Patrick W. Ashton (collectively "Ashtons"), on the other hand. [R. 754]. The Order 
adjudicated that the Easement Document did not burden one of the parcels of property 
owned by plaintiffs (defined as the "Carter Parcel" below) based upon the Recording 
Act and the fact that a portion of the Carter Parcel was, at the time the Easement 
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Document was purportedly given, owned by someone other than the grantors named in 
the Easement Document. The Order also dismissed with prejudice the Counterclaim of 
Sykes and Frontier seeking to establish title by adverse possession to a portion of 
plaintiffs' property. No appeal of that Order has been taken. 
Plaintiffs filed a motion on September 21, 2001 seeking a determination that the 
Easement Document was invalid because there was a lack of consideration for the 
Easement Document. [R. 757]. On October 26, 2001, Sykes and Frontier filed a 
"Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Part 1 of 4: Public Roadway" (the 
"Public Road Motion"). [R. 946]. The Trial Court, the Honorable Anthony W. 
Schofield presiding, entered an Order on Motions on September 20, 2002 [R. 1491] 
granting plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and denying defendants' 
Public Road Motion. 
On May 21, 2003, Sykes Trust and Frontier filed a Motion to Amend Pleadings to 
add counterclaims of easement by implication, easement by necessity, prescriptive 
easement, and public road. [R. 1719]. By Minute Entry dated May 23, 2003, the Trial 
Court denied that motion. [R. 1721]. 
The action was tried to the Honorable Gary D. Stott on June 17, 18, and 19, 2003 
and October 6, 7, and 8, 2003. The Court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law [R. 2129] and a Final Judgment [R. 2136] on April 28, 2004, which granted 
plaintiffs judgment against Sykes Trust and Frontier in the approximate amount of 
$1,000,000.00 for slander of title and intentional interference with economic relations 
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and dismissed with prejudice the Counterclaim of Sykes and Frontier for boundary by 
acquiescence. 
On May 27, 2004, appellants filed a Notice of Appeal [R. 2158] solely from "the 
Final Judgment entered in this case on April 28, 2004 . . . ." No appeal was taken from 
any of the Court's prior rulings mentioned above, although appellants' Brief attacks 
some of them. 
Statement of Facts 
Appellants do not challenge any of the Court's Findings of Fact,1 which are 
included under Tab A in the Addendum (hereafter cited as the "Findings"). Berkshires 
purchased for development from David and Helen Carter ("Carters") and from the 
Ashtons two tracts of undeveloped real property located in Orem, Utah (respectively, the 
"Carter Parcel" and the "Ashton Parcel"). [Findings, % 9]. The relative locations of 
those Parcels are depicted on the diagram that follows on page 7a. Adjacent to both the 
Carter Parcel and the Ashton Parcel were parcels of real estate owned by, among others, 
Sykes Trust. After Berkshires contracted to purchase the Carter and Ashton Parcels, but 
before the closing, Sykes, acting on behalf of Frontier and Sykes Trust, aggressively 
opposed Berkshires' efforts to secure city approval for its proposed residential 
subdivision project. [Findings, % 10]. Just hours before the closing of Berkshires' 
Appellants' Brief at page 1 implies that its challenge to the District Court's 
refusal to entertain its Public Road Motion somehow involves a finding of fact. First, 
that issue was decided by the Court before trial and so the Findings of Fact are irrelevant 
to it Second, appellants' argument on this point at pages 16-19 of their Brief does not 
address any finding of fact, much less marshal the evidence with respect to any finding 
of fact as appellants concede they must. 
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purchase of the Carter Parcel in 1999, Sykes recorded with the Utah County Recorder (i) 
a Quit Claim Deed from Hugh and Evelyn Wentz to Dennis Sykes, Dwane Sykes, and 
Frontier dated October 9, 1976 (the "Quit Claim Deed") and (ii) the Easement 
Document, which was purportedly executed by P.E. and Eleanor Ashton, Ralph and 
Elva Carter, and Hugh and Evelyn Wentz dated June 1, 1977. [Findings, f 11]. The 
Easement Document recited that it was executed in 1977 — some 22 years prior to its 
recordation. As of the date of recording of the Easement Document, all of its purported 
signatories were deceased. [Findings, f 13], The Easement Document purported to 
create burdensome easements covering large areas of the Carter Parcel and Ashton 
Parcel and even purported to create an easement through the center of the Carter's 
house. The Easement Document purported to create a huge right-of-way, 66 feet in 
width, that comprised several acres of area on the Ashton Parcel. The easements 
purportedly created by the Easement Document rendered large portions of the Carter 
Parcel and Ashton Parcel unusable for subdivision purposes. [Findings, If 14]. The 
following diagram depicts the parcels identified above.2 
[See following page 7a for diagram,] 
2This diagram is an approximate composite of Exhibit "G" to the Court's 
Findings and a survey of the easements shown on Exhibit 19 introduced at trial. 
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NORTH 
Cross-hatched area is 66' wide 
easement created in Easement 
Document, 
Carter Parcel and Ashton Pateel now owned by Berkshires 
North Parcel now owned by Mark Sykes 
Center Parcel and South Parcel owned by Sykes Trust 
APPROXIMATE SCALE: 1" = 2501 
7a 
Sykes brought to the attention of Orem City the Easement Document to frustrate 
Berkshires' efforts to obtain approvals for its proposed subdivision. Just prior to 
recordation of the Easement Document, Orem City regarded Berkshires as having met 
all requirements for final approval of its proposed subdivision, which included both the 
Carter Parcel and the Ashton Parcel. [Findings, ^ 16]. As a result of Sykes' recordation 
of the Easement Document, Orem City withheld approval of large portions of 
Berkshires' proposed subdivision, which in turn forced Berkshires to completely 
reformat its proposed subdivision. [Findings, f^ 18]. Shortly following Orem City's 
refusal to approve Berkshires' proposed subdivision because of the Easement 
Document, Sykes communicated to Berkshires that he controlled Sykes Trust and 
property owned by Frontier and that he could make the Easement Document "go away." 
He stated, however that he would not make the Easement Document go away unless 
Berkshires gave him properties worth in excess of $1,000,000.00. Sykes so acted with 
malice and with the express intent to blackmail plaintiffs, [Findings, fflf 20 and 49]. As 
a direct result of Sykes' frustration of Berkshires' subdivision process, Berkshires and 
Ashtons suffered damages arising from delays in development, engineering costs to 
reformat the subdivision, legal fees, and increased carrying costs for interest and taxes in 
an aggregate amount of $992,716.91. [Findings, <|fl[ 56-60]. 
The Trial Court found that Sykes was an officer of and in total control of Frontier 
and had actual and apparent authority to act on behalf of Frontier. [Findings, ^ | 21-23]. 
The Trial Court also found that Sykes Trust authorized Sykes to act on its behalf and 
8 
that Sykes essentially controlled Sykes Trust. [Findings, *H 24-34]. The Trial Court 
found that Sykes and his various entities (Sykes Trust and Frontier were those entities) 
have assigned, disposed of, and concealed property with the intent to defraud creditors. 
[Findings, T| 63]. 
Forgery is a persistent phenomenon surrounding Dwane Sykes. Frontier asserted 
ownership of a parcel of land claimed by Mark Sykes pursuant to warranty deeds 
purportedly executed by William Christiansen in favor of Frontier.3 [Findings, ^ 68 
and 69]. The signature of Christiansen on each of those deeds was forged. Dwane 
Sykes was the notary on each. [Findings, fflj 68 and 69; Exhibits 73 and 75]. Dwane 
Sykes' first wife, Patricia Sykes, asserted in a recorded document that her signature had 
been forged to a document purportedly conveying her property to Dwane Sykes while 
they were divorcing. [T. 778-787; Exhibits 16 and 17]. The Court found that a Quit-
Claim Deed running from B. Diane George (Dwane Sykes' second wife) in favor of him 
during their divorce was also forged by Sykes. [Findings, ^ 64(b)]. Although not 
legally relevant, it is interesting that Sykes moved to disqualify the Honorable Claudia 
Lay cock as a judge in this case because while she was a prosecutor, "Mr. Sykes was 
prosecuted for and entered a no contest plea to the charge of felony forgery... ." [R. 
1326]. 
Point III of appellants' Brief asserts that plaintiffs' handwriting expert and other 
lay witnesses were not entitled to testify that the Easement Document was a forgery 
3This ownership was an issue tried as part of Frontier's claim of boundary by 
acquiescence. 
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because of the existence of a "subscribing witness," Sharon Peterson — now Sharon 
Davis. The Court's finding that Sharon Peterson did not witness their signatures and 
was not a subscribing witness is a factual finding as to which appellants must marshal 
evidence and attack.4 
The Trial Court found that "Dwane Sykes forged all of the signatures of P.E. 
Ashton, Eleanor L. Ashton, Hugh Vern Wentz, Evelyn G. Wentz, Ralph L. Carter, and 
Elva B. Carter as they appear on the Easement Document...." If the Trial Court had 
found that Sharon Peterson witnessed these parties' signatures, none of those findings 
are even theoretically possible. The Trial Court found that Sharon Peterson "could not 
state with certainty that she executed as notary the Easement Document and Quit Claim 
Deed, that she had no memory of notarizing those documents, and that she had no 
memory of the signatories executing them before her." [Findings, ^ 36(q)]. The Trial 
Court also found that Patricia Sykes (who functioned as the corporate Secretary of 
Frontier while she was married to Dwane Sykes) "saw blank notarizations executed by 
Sharon Peterson in . . . Dwane Sykes' home office." [Findings, ^36(o)]. Sharon 
Peterson conceded a cordial, friendly, and trusting relationship with Dwane Sykes. [T. 
1007-08]. To help him, she executed an affidavit for Sykes that was in many material 
4Appellants apparently believe that they have no obligation to marshal the 
evidence and attack the Trial Court's factual finding that Sharon Peterson did not 
witness this document based upon their view that whether Sharon Peterson was a 
"subscribing witness" is based upon the interpretation of a statute and is reviewed for 
correctness. [Appellants' Brief, f^ 3 at p. 2]. 
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respects false,5 and voluntarily traveled from Oregon to Utah County for the trial of this 
case at Dwane Sykes' expense [T. 1064]. Ms. Peterson conceded that in a significant 
number of cases (approximately 10%) she notarized documents for signatories who did 
not execute or acknowledge them in her presence. [T. 1035-1036, 1041]. Appellants do 
not challenge the Trial Court's findings (i) that Peterson could not state that she 
executed the Easement Document as notary, (ii) that she had no memory of notarizing 
these documents, and (iii) that she had no memory of the signatories executing them 
before her. 
The following facts, each of which the Trial Court found and none of which 
appellants challenge, establish both that Sharon Peterson was not a subscribing witness 
and that the Easement Document was forged. The following are verbatim quotes of 
subparagraphs (a) - (p) of Paragraph 36 of the Trial Court's Findings. The material in 
brackets is not a part of the Findings but is added in clarification of the Findings. 
(a) All six signatures on the Easement Document and the 
two signatures on the Quit Claim Deed [which was purportedly 
5For example, Peterson testified at trial [T. 1003-04] and in affidavit (Ex. 175, f^ 
1) that she never notarized a document without the signatory signing in her presence and 
giving picture identification, but on cross examination conceded that about 10% of the 
time she notarized documents that she never witnessed and were not acknowledged 
before her. [T. 1035-36, 1041]. Peterson gave Sykes an affidavit, to help him [T. 
1029], stating on "personal knowledge" that the signatories on the Easement Document 
personally appeared before her, presented photo identification, and executed the 
document as their free and voluntary act [Ex. 175, Tflj 7-9], but at trial she stated that she 
had absolutely no memory of any of the grantors even signing, much less presenting 
identification, and that she had no idea if they signed voluntarily. [T. 1009-1010, 1024-
1029]. Peterson signed the Ex. 175 Affidavit based on the assurance of Dwane Sykes 
that it was accurate. [T. 1030-31]. It is clear that Ms. Peterson would accommodate Mr. 
Sykes in many ways if she was willing to give him false affidavits. 
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executed 8 months earlier] were signed using the same pen. 
(b) Both the Quit Claim Deed and the Easement Document 
[although dated 8 months apart] were typed on the same typewriter at 
the same time. 
(c) George Throckmorton, an eminent handwriting expert, 
testified that all six signatures [on the Easement Document] are in all 
likelihood simulated forgeries. 
(d) P.E. Ashton did not like Dwane Sykes, and it makes no 
sense that he would grant a burdensome easement to Sykes or his 
entities over several acres of his property for just ten dollars, as 
claimed by Dwane Sykes. 
(e) P.E. and Eleanor Ashton always consulted with their 
[attorney-] son, John Ashton, regarding legal matters, but they never 
consulted with him about the Easement Document. The signatures 
of P.E. Ashton and Eleanor L. Ashton did not appear genuine to John 
Ashton, their son, who was familiar with their signatures. 
(f) Ralph Carter did not like Dwane Sykes. It makes no 
sense that Ralph Carter would, for almost no consideration, give 
Dwane Sykes a right-of-way, particularly one that went through the 
middle of his house and barn. Years after the right-of-way was 
purportedly given, Dwane Sykes asked Ralph Carter for an easement 
over the same area. Years after the Easement Document was 
purportedly executed, Dwane Sykes attempted to pass over the 
easement area, but Ralph Carter blocked his access and would not 
allow him access. 
(g) Dwane Sykes, who is sophisticated in the real estate 
area, did not, according to his testimony, record the Easement 
Document for approximately 22 years after it was purportedly 
executed, and when he did so, he did it just hours before Berkshires's 
closing on the purchase of the Carter Parcel. His explanation for the 
delay was contradictory and not credible. 
(h) On the date that the Easement Document was 
purportedly executed, both Dwane and Patricia Sykes owned the 
Center Parcel and South Parcel, which were parcels benefitted by the 
Easement Document. As a person sophisticated in real estate, 
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Dwane Sykes knew that Patricia Sykes, as an owner of the parcels 
purportedly benefitted by the Easement Document, should have been 
included as a grantee, but she was not included. [Dwane and Patricia 
divorced between the purported date of the Easement Document and 
its recordation.] 
(i) Hugh Vern Wentz was a Judge and lawyer who would 
know that, after he gave the Quit Claim Deed, he was not a necessary 
signatory to the Easement Document, which granted easements only 
over land included within the Quit Claim Deed. At the time of the 
purported execution of the Easement Document, Hugh Vem Wentz 
had suffered serious health problems, couldn't drive a car, and was 
mentally and physically impaired. It is not credible that he drafted 
and executed the Easement Document and Quit Claim Deed and 
circulated them for signature, as Dwane Sykes claims. 
(j) Dwane Sykes, who actively opposed Berkshires's 
subdivision approval for a long period of time, did not mention the 
existence of the Easement Document for months. In October, 1999, 
he asked Orem City to condition Berkshires's subdivision approval 
on Berkshires's giving rights-of-way to the Sykes's parcels, which is 
inconsistent with the pre-existence of the Easement Document, 
which granted rights-of-way over the same areas. 
(k) In meetings with Berkshires representatives just a few 
weeks before November 30, 1999, Dwane Sykes did not mention any 
written or express easement, but instead claimed that the Sykes 
family owned a prescriptive easement over the areas over which an 
express easement was granted by the Easement Document. 
(I) Dwane Sykes told Berkshires after November 30, 1999 
that he had seen the signatories execute the Easement Document, 
while at trial he testified that he had not. 
(m) No one other than Dwane Sykes saw the Easement 
Document or Quit Claim Deed in the approximately 22 years 
between their execution and their recordation. Diane George, who is 
or was the spouse of Dwane Sykes, was not credible when she 
testified that she saw the Easement Document prior to November, 
1999. The Court finds that she did not even attend the meeting at 
which she claimed to have seen the Easement Document and she 
claimed at that meeting to have seen a survey that did not yet exist at 
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the time of the meeting. 
(n) Dennis Sykes, a shareholder and officer of Frontier 
who, along with Dennis Sykes himself, were named grantees under 
the Easement Document and Quit Claim Deed, never saw either 
document and was completely unaware of their existence until after 
this action was filed [in June, 2000]. 
(o) Patricia Sykes, Dwane Sykesfs former wife, who was 
Secretary of Frontier and intimately involved in all real property 
dealings of the Sykes family and their entities, never saw or heard 
about the Easement Document or the Quit Claim Deed prior to the 
filing of this action. Her relationship to the Sykes family's real 
property dealings was such that she would have known of the 
existence of the Easement Document and Quit Claim Deed had they 
existed at the time they were purportedly executed and thereafter. 
Patricia Sykes saw blank notarizations executed by Sharon Peterson, 
the purported Notary of the Easement Document, in Dwane Sykes's 
home office in the late 1970s. 
(p) Mark Sykes, the son of Dwane Sykes, was completely 
unaware of any dealings with the Carters or Ashtons regarding a 
right-of-way and did not see and was not aware of the Easement 
Document or Quit Claim Deed until after this action was filed. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point LA - This Court should not consider Point I of appellants' Brief because an 
Order denying a motion for summary judgment is not appealable. 
Point LB - This Court should not consider Point I of appellants' Brief because it 
is independently supported by the Trial Court's determination that no admissible 
evidence supported the Public Road Motion, a basis not challenged on appeal. 
Point I.C - The Trial Court correctly denied appellants' claim for summary 
judgment on the affirmative claim that a public road existed on defendants' property 
because appellants pleaded no such affirmative claim. 
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Point LP - Whether the Trial Court is required to treat a defense as a 
counterclaim under Rule 8(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, is reviewed based on an 
abuse of discretion standard, not the "clearly erroneous" standard urged by appellants. 
Point I.E - The Trial Court correctly exercised its discretion to not treat 
appellants' affirmative defense as a counterclaim. 
Point H.A - The Trial Court evenhandedly allowed both parties to present 
Motions for Summary Judgment after the dispositive motion cutoff date. 
Point II.B - The Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing appellants' 
request to amend to state a public road claim, which would have created a completely 
new factual area in the case when appellants abused the judicial process, ignored 
deadlines and rules, discovery had been closed for a long time, the motions were filed 2 
and 3 years after the case was filed, and defendants had knowledge of the factual basis 
for their claims at the outset of the case. 
Point HI.A - Appellants cannot contest the Trial Court's admission into evidence 
of the testimony of George Throckmorton and the grantors' children on the issue of 
handwriting because appellants introduced some such evidence themselves and never 
objected to the introduction of this evidence at trial. 
Point III.B - Because appellants have not marshaled the evidence on whether 
Peterson was a "subscribing witness," the Court should assume that the Trial Court's 
finding that she was not was supported by the evidence. 
Point III.C - Appellants have not advanced any evidence that Peterson was a 
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"subscribing witness." 
Point IILD - The Trial Court necessarily found that Peterson was not a 
subscribing witness by finding that the signatures on the Easement Document were 
forged and not signed by signatories in her presence. 
Point III.E - Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-2-10 and -14 do not by their terms preclude 
evidence suggesting that the grantors did not sign a document other than handwriting 
evidence specifically. 
Point III F - The Supreme Court's holding in Cazares should be changed 
consistently with the purpose of Utah Code Ann. § 57-2-10 and -12 so as not to preclude 
handwriting evidence on the issue whether a document is a forgery. 
Point IV - The undisputed facts before the Trial Court established that there was 
no consideration or a lack of consideration for the Easement Document. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY ADDRESSED 
APPELLANTS' CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT, PART 1 OF 4: PUBLIC ROADWAY 
Appellants' Brief argues that the Trial Court failed to hear defendant's Public 
Road Motion. The sole error suggested by appellants is that the Sykes Trust's "Seventh 
Defense" of its Answer should have been construed as an affirmative claim. 
[Appellants' Brief, pp. 16-19]. For the following four independently sufficient reasons, 
appellants' argument must fail. 
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A. Through the Court's Order on Motions, the Trial Court only denied a 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Plainly, no appeal lies from a denial of a 
Motion for Summary Judgment. Denison v. Crown Toyota Motors, Inc., 571 P.2d 1359, 
1360 (Utah 1977); Christensen v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 443 P.2d 385, 389 (Utah 1961); 
Courtney v. Big O Tires, Inc., 87 P.3d 931, 932 (Id. 2003) ["An order denying a motion 
for summary judgment is neither a final order that can be directly appealed nor is it an 
order that can be reviewed on appeal from a final judgment in the action."] 
B. The Court's Order on Motions, which addressed the Public Road Motion, 
denied that claim on multiple grounds, one of which was "because . . . (ii) no admissible 
evidence supports it." [Order on Motions, R. 1491 at J^ 3]. Appellants do not attack this 
finding of the Trial Court, which independently supports its denial of the Motion.6 The 
Trial Court, although requested to do so, did not refuse to consider the Public Road 
Motion, but instead addressed it on its merits. [Ruling, R. 1477, second paragraph], 
C. Everyone concedes that no affirmative claim was filed by any party 
seeking to establish a public road in this case. The pleadings of Sykes and Frontier 
contain no reference whatsoever to such a claim or "defense." The Answer of Sykes 
Trust in Seventh Defense states only that "Hope Lane is a public road." [R. 75-76]. It 
does not state whether that claim is based on dedication, grant, or user and does not 
6Although not before this Court because appellants have not appealed from that 
aspect of the Trial Court's ruling, the Trial Court struck the affidavits submitted in 
support of the Public Road Motion because the affiants in those affidavits "were not 
timely or properly identified in response to discovery requests," and "because one 
affidavit contained] statements that are not admissible in evidence." [Order on 
Motions, R. 1491 atffif 1 and 2]. 
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explain how this defense relates to plaintiffs' Complaint. Rule 8(a) requires that any 
claim for relief must "contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 
the pleader is entitled to relief. . . and . . . a demand for judgment for the relief to which 
he deems himself entitled." Sykes Trust's Answer asks only for a dismissal of 
plaintiffs' Complaint and costs — no affirmative relief is requested. A court cannot 
adjudicate and enter judgment on an unpleaded claim. Combe v. Warrens' Family 
Drive-Inns, Inc., 680 P.2d 733, 735-36 (Utah 1984); Taylor v. E. M. Royle Corp., 264 
P.2d 279, 280 (Utah 1953). 
Clearly Sykes and Frontier could not move for summary judgment on this ground 
because no pleading of theirs even mentions it. It is important to note that only Sykes, 
B. Diane George, and Frontier filed the Public Road Motion. Sykes Trust filed no 
independent motion; rather, it filed a three-line statement in which its new counsel "files 
his appearance and joinder of prior motions and objections of the other defendants." [R. 
1305], Unless the Court chose to view Sykes Trust's joinder in the other defendants' 
motion as its own independent Public Road Motion and to view Sykes Trust's 
affirmative defense as an unpleaded counterclaim, the Trial Court correctly refused 
summary judgment on this ground as well. Whether the defense should be viewed as a 
claim is addressed in the following section. 
D. Appellants incorrectly frame their argument on this point as a challenge to 
the Court's Findings of Fact mandating a "clearly erroneous" standard of review. 
[Appellants' Brief, p. 16]. The Order on Motions which denied the Public Road Motion 
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was entered in September, 2002 — a long, long time before the case was tried. 
Addressing whether the Court was required under Rule 8(c), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, to treat a defense as a counterclaim, "if justice so requires" must instead be 
reviewed based upon an abuse of discretion standard,7 which is addressed in the 
following section. 
E. The Trial Court properly exercised its discretion to not treat Sykes Trust's 
affirmative defense as a counterclaim. Plaintiffs initiated this action in June, 2000. On 
January 23, 2001, the Court entered a Case Management Order which required Initial 
Disclosures by March 9, 2001 and a discovery completion date of April 7, 2001. [R. 
233]. After close of discovery, plaintiffs filed Motions for Partial Summary Judgment 
in early May, 2001, which the Court granted in August, 2001, adjudicating that the 
Easement Document did not burden the Carter Parcel (i.e., that the leg of the easement 
created by the Easement Document connecting it to Carterville Road was broken). [R. 
754]. To circumvent that ruling, Sykes and Frontier then filed the Public Road Motion 
in October, 2001 [R. 946] claiming that the dead-end road across that broken leg area 
was a public road that furnished access to the remainder of the Easement Document's 
easements. At that time, discovery was closed. The public road issue as argued now 
concerns only public use — an issue that was never previously joined or discovered 
upon. In support of the Public Road Motion, Sykes and Frontier filed the affidavits of 
Dwane Sykes, B. Diane George, David Beutler, Jay Van Wagoner, Joy L. Sykes Fair, 
7The federal courts, addressing the comparable federal rule, so hold. E.g., Amoco 
Oil Co. v. Gomez, 379 F.3d 1266 (11th Cir. 2004), cert denied. 125 S. Ct. 1693 (2005). 
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Wayne Asay, Dick Taylor, Karen Decker, Leland Carter, and John Emmons. Most of 
those affidavits were filed on or about November 20, 2001, which was the date the 
motion was to be heard — long after briefing on this motion was closed pursuant to Rule 
4-501, CJA, as the Trial Court stated in paragraph 1 of its Order on Motions. [R. 1490]. 
Taylor, Decker, Carter, Emmons, and Asay were not identified as witnesses in response 
to discovery requests, and the Trial Court struck them. [Order on Motions at ^ 2, R. 
1490]. The Court in its Ruling dated July 31, 2002 [R. 1467] observed that appellants 
presented "a moving target" throughout these proceedings, ignoring Court-ordered 
deadlines and the CJA, filing affidavits on the day the motion was set for argument, 
never asking for additional time to brief the motion, not identifying witnesses in 
interrogatory answers, not supplementing interrogatory answers, etc. The reasons why 
the Trial Court denied leave to amend to state a public road claim (set forth below in 
Point II) also support the Trial Court's refusal to treat Sykes Trust's defense as an 
affirmative claim. Clearly, the procedural posture of the case (discovery closed and 
dispositive motions filed) and appellants' misbehavior and abuse of the litigation 
process support the Trial Court's decision. Appellants cite only Cheney v. Rucker, 381 
P.2d 86 (Utah 1963), in support of their claim that the Sykes Trust's pleading of an 
affirmative defense should allow a Motion for Summary Judgment on that defense as an 
affirmative claim. Cheney does not even address that subject.8 
^Cheney held only that when a novation issue was not pleaded as an affirmative 
defense, it was properly allowed as an issue at trial because the party against whom the 
defense was raised "made no request for continuance nor did he make any representa-
tion to the court that he was taken by surprise or otherwise at a disadvantage in meeting 
that issue." 381 P.2dat91. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY ADDRESSED THE 
PARTIES' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AND DENIED LEAVE TO AMEND 
Point II of appellants' Brief confuses two concepts — (i) the Court's entertaining 
or not entertaining Motions for Summary Judgment after the dispositive motion cutoff 
date and (ii) the Trial Court's refusing to allow the defendants to amend. These two 
completely separate issues will be treated separately below: 
A. The Trial Court did not apply the dispositive motion cutoff date to the 
detriment of appellants. 
The Trial Court entered a Case Management Order on January 3, 2001, 
which established a discovery cutoff date of April 7, 2001, a dispositive motion cutoff 
date of May 7, 2001, and a final pre-trial conference on June 15, 2001. [R. 233]. It was 
never amended. Plaintiffs timely moved for partial summary judgment on May 4 and 
May 7, 2001. The Trial Court granted plaintiffs' motions by Order dated August 22, 
2001. [R. 754]. 
After the cutoff date for dispositive motions of May 7, 2001, the Ashton 
plaintiffs filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on September 19, 2001 [R. 757], and 
Sykes and Frontier filed their Public Road Motion on October 26, 2001. [R. 946]. Both 
motions were argued to the Trial Court on July 2, 2002 and the Court entered its Ruling 
dated July 31, 2002. [R. 1467]. The Trial Court in its Ruling declined to strike the 
motion of Sykes and Frontier as requested by plaintiffs but instead ruled on that motion. 
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The Trial Court stated, "It is clear the parties tacitly agreed to ignore that [dispositive 
motion] cut off date. I will too, but only as to the motions treated in this ruling." 
[Ruling, p. 4, n. 5, R. 1464]. The Order on Motions entered pursuant to that Ruling 
addressed both parties' Motions, denied Sykes' and Frontier's Motion, but granted the 
plaintiffs' Motion. [Order on Motions, ff 3 and 5, R. 1489]. Appellants' argument that 
the Trial Court unfairly prejudiced them by retroactively applying a dispositive motion 
cutoff date is therefore factually flawed — the Trial Court entertained both parties' 
dispositive motions after the cutoff date because of the parties' "tacit agreement" to 
extend that date. 
B, The Trial Court correctly refused defendants' requests to amend. 
The propriety of the Trial Court's rulings on amendments hinges on the 
procedural history of this case. On June 29, 2000, plaintiffs filed this action. [R. 0024]. 
After issue was joined and the parties conducted various discovery, the Trial Court 
entered its Case Management Order on January 3, 2001. [R. 233]. Thereafter, the 
parties conducted further written and deposition discovery. Discovery cutoff as 
scheduled by the Case Management Order was April 7, 2001. Plaintiffs filed two 
Motions for Partial Summary Judgment on May 4 and May 7, 2001. [R. 496, 611]. The 
Trial Court entered its Memorandum Decision granting plaintiffs' Motions for Partial 
Summary Judgment on July 12, 2001. [R. 734]. On July 25, 2001, Samuel D. McVey 
withdrew as counsel for George, Sykes, and Frontier. [R. 737]. Plaintiffs filed Notices 
to Appoint Counsel on July 26 and July 30, 2001. [R. 740, 743]. On September 19, 
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2001, Ashtons filed a follow-on Motion for Summary Judgment based upon the Trial 
Court's previous Order granting the Berkshires' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
[R. 757]. By Notice dated October 18, 2001, the Trial Court set argument on Ashtons' 
motion for November 20, 2001. [R. 939]. On October 26, 2001, Sykes, Frontier, and 
George (but not the Sykes Trust), through Sykes, who is law trained, but not a member 
of the Bar,9 filed their Public Road Motion. [R. 946]. On October 26, 2001, Sykes filed 
a "Notice of Unanticipated Absence from State and Motion for Continuance of Hearing" 
seeking to delay the hearing of those motions. [R. 1020]. Sykes continued filing 
affidavits in support of the Public Road Motion and in opposition to plaintiffs' motion 
all the way through the day for the hearing — on November 20, 2001. [R. 1145, 1158, 
1162, 1163]. The day before the hearing, on November 19, 2001, Sykes, Frontier, and 
George — not the Sykes Trust — filed their "Motion for Ruling Declaring the Sufficiency 
of Defendants' Answer and Counterclaim and that the Pleadings Conform to the 
Evidence or Alternatively Motion to Amend Pleadings." [R. 1171]. The Memorandum 
in support thereof includes a request to amend to state a public road claim. [R. 1175], 
The day of the hearing, Dwane Sykes filed his Affidavit seeking to "correct" his 
deposition, on which plaintiffs relied in their motion, which was taken in January, 2001 
— about 10 months before the hearing. The "corrections" included over five pages of 
typewritten, single-spaced changes to the substantive content of the deposition. [R. 
1190]. Sykes attended the hearing of the Motions for Summary Judgment set November 
9Sykes received a Juris Doctorate degree in the 1980fs. [T. 171]. 
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20, 2001, and after the Trial Court rejected certain of his initial requests, he waved out a 
bankruptcy petition that he filed the day before the hearing. [R. 1168]. Plaintiffs later 
obtained relief from the stay to allow them to continue to proceed with this action. [R. 
1204]. The Sykes group then filed yet more affidavits addressing the pending motions, 
as to which briefing had closed months before. [R. 1224, 1251]. The hearing of the 
pending Motions was set again before Judge Claudia Laycock for May 2, 2002. [R. 
1254]. Sykes filed a "Motion for Change of Judge" on April 26, 2002 objecting to 
Judge Laycock on the grounds that she was a part of the prosecutorial team who 
prosecuted him for forgery. [R. 1288, 1290]. Sam Primavera entered his appearance as 
counsel for the Trust, Frontier, and B. Diane George on April 29, 2002 — some 9 months 
after plaintiffs filed their notice requiring an appearance on behalf of those parties. [R. 
1305]. 
On April 1, 2002, Judge Laycock recused. [R. 1327]. On May 2, 2002, 
Judge Schofieid took over the case and set hearing of the motions for June 18, 2002. [R. 
1329]. On June 10, 2002, the Sykes Trust, Frontier, and George filed a voluminous 
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment — over 6 
months late. [R. 1331-1441]. On July 31, 2002, Judge Schofieid entered his Ruling [R. 
1480] and on September 20, 2002 entered his Order on Motions [R.1491]. As concerns 
the motion of Sykes, Frontier, and George to amend (as of this time, Sykes Trust had not 
moved to amend), the Trial Court's Ruling stated as follows: 
Although the Case Management Order does not establish a date by 
which amendments to the pleadings may be made, with a planned 
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final pre-trial in June, 2001, the clear contemplation of the parties 
was that all of the pleadings were adequate. At this late date, when 
discovery is complete and dispositive motions have passed, it is too 
late to amend pleadings to assert new claims." [R. 1457]. 
Paragraph 6 of the Order on Motions denies the Motion to Amend because "(i) it was 
made after the close of discovery and after the date for dispositive motions, (ii) no 
grounds have been advanced why the Motion could not have been made at an earlier 
time, and (iii) plaintiff would be prejudiced were the Motion granted." [R. 1488]. The 
Trial Court set a trial date of June 17, 2003 by Minute entered March 19, 2003. [R. 
1590]. Sykes Trust filed its Motion to Amend to assert a public road claim two months 
later on May 21, 2003 — less than one month before trial began. [R. 1719]. By Minute 
Entry dated May 23, 2003 [R. 1721], the Trial Court denied Sykes Trust's motion. 
The foregoing recitation establishes that the Trial Court did not abuse its 
discretion in declining to allow amendment. Sykes recorded the Easement Document, 
as the Trial Court found, to prevent and delay Berkshires in developing its property. 
Berkshires filed this case in June, 2000 and attempted, as best it could, to clear title to its 
property and minimize its damages. At each juncture, defendants resisted, delayed, 
replaced counsel, filed bankruptcy, requested continuances, objected to judges, etc., all 
in an effort to keep the pressure on plaintiffs to pay the blackmail that the Trial Court 
found was demanded. Sykes' request and the request of the entities that the Trial Court 
found he controlled (Frontier and Sykes Trust) to amend, to assert counterclaims, to 
extend discovery, and to extend the trial date were all in furtherance of this blackmail 
plan — the more Berkshires was delayed in its efforts to subdivide, the greater the 
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pressure to pay Sykes the blackmail that he demanded. 
These procedural and substantive facts are germane to the reasonableness of the 
Court's decision to deny leave to amend: First, the amendment would have completely 
changed the character of the case. As of the date of the request for amendment, there 
were at issue plaintiffs' claims seeking to invalidate the written Easement Document and 
for damages and defendants' claim of boundary by acquiescence. None of those claims 
concern in any respect use, much less public use, of a roadway.10 Accordingly, none of 
the parties' discovery efforts focused on use issues. To have allowed the amendment 
would have been to create a completely different case requiring completely different 
discovery issues and motions. Second, it is important to note that only the Sykes Trust's 
request for amendment is relevant here because the other parties seeking amendment, 
Sykes, Frontier, and George, owned no property in the area. As to Sykes and George, 
neither of them owned any property at the time of the amendment. [Order on Motions, f^ 
5(i), R. 1489; Ruling, p. 7, R. 1474]. Frontier, as the Trial Court found, owned no 
interest in the property when plaintiffs filed this action, but claimed an interest by virtue 
of a deed recorded October 12, 2000, executed in 1991, through which it claimed an 
interest in part of the subject property. [Ruling, pp. 7-8, R. 1474]. That deed, however, 
gave Frontier no interest because after trial the Trial Court found that this deed was 
forged and it was a nullity. [Findings, f^ 69]. Thus, none of the defendants other than 
Sykes Trust had standing to assert the public road claim at all. And Sykes Trust filed its 
10Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104 establishes a public road after continuous public 
use for 10 years. 
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Motion for Leave to Amend less than one month before trial began and almost three 
years after this case was initiated. 
"Absent a clear abuse of discretion, this Court will not disturb a trial court's 
ruling on a motion to amend." Kelly v. Utah Power & Light, 746 P.2d 1189, 1190 (UT 
App. 1987); Girardv. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245, 248 (Utah 1983). Although the rule 
allowing amendments is liberally construed when justice requires it, the "dimensions of 
liberality are generally defined by the trial judge, who is best positioned to evaluate the 
motion" in the context of the lawsuit pending before him/her. Smith v. Grand Canyon 
Expeditions Co., 2003 UT 57, ^  32, 84 P.3d 1154. The Utah appellate courts have 
principally addressed three factors bearing upon the propriety of granting or denying a 
requested amendment: "(1) The timeliness of the motion; (2) the moving party's reason 
for the delay; (3) the resulting prejudice to the responding party." Harper v. Summit 
County, 963 P.2d 768, 779 (UT App. 1998), aff d andrev'd in part (on other grounds), 
2001 UT 10, 26 P.3d 193; Atcitty v. Board of Education, 967 P.2d 1261, 1264 (UT App. 
1998); Kelly v. Hard Money Lending, 2004 UT App. 44, «f 26, 87 P.3d 734. Those 
factors here justify the Court's decision. As to timeliness, the motions were filed 
approximately 2 and 3 years after the case was filed, after the close of discovery, and 
after the outside date for dispositive motions. Sykes Trust's motion was filed less than a 
month before trial "(Mjotions to amend are typically deemed untimely when they are 
filed in the advanced procedural stages of the litigation process, such as after the 
completion of discovery . . . " and have also typically been deemed untimely when they 
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were filed several years into the litigation. Kelly v. Hard Money Lending, 2004 UT App. 
44, Tflj 29-30, 87 P.3d 734. Both such circumstances exist here. As to the reason for 
delay, the Trial Court found, and appellants do not challenge, that "no grounds have 
been advanced why the motion could not have been made at an earlier time." [Order on 
Motions, f 6, R. 1488], It is inconceivable that the Sykes defendants and Sykes Trust 
did not, when they filed their Answers, know the relevant facts (public use of a road by 
their property) upon which their belated public road claim was based, since it is 
undisputed that Sykes Trust has owned property in the immediate area of Hope Lane for 
in excess of 25 years [T. 979], Sykes (who is the Vice-President of Frontier) has lived 
on that very property since 1974 [T. 979], and Diane George was married to Sykes and 
lived there with him from December, 1998 to October, 2002. [T. 356]. There cannot, 
therefore, be any legitimate reason for the delay. Finally, the third factor, prejudice, is 
present here. Prejudice exists when an opposing party will not have an opportunity to 
meet a newly-raised matter at trial. Kelly v. Hard Money Lending, 2004 UT App. 44, J^ 
31, 87 P.3d 734. Delaying trial has also been found by Utah appellate courts to 
constitute prejudice. Westley v. Farmer's Insurance Exchange, 663 P.2d 93, 94 (Utah 
1983); Kelly v. Utah Power & Light, 746 P.2d 1189, 1191 (UT App. 1987); Harper v. 
Summit County, 963 P.2d 768, 779-80 (UT App. 1998), aff dandrev'd in part (on other 
grounds), 2001 UT 10, 26 P.3d 193. Here, the prejudice is more than just delay — it is 
undisputed that Sykes recorded the Easement Document to delay and prevent 
Berkshires' development of a subdivision on its property. That development was, as the 
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Trial Court found, significantly delayed. [Findings, ^ 56(b)(c); R. 2113-12]. To have 
injected into this case, after it had been pending 2 to 3 years, a claim that a public road 
went through that subdivision would have further compounded the already huge 
damages caused by Sykes. 
The appellate courts, in cases indistinguishable from this one, have sustained trial 
courts' denials of motions for leave to amend. Westley v. Farmer's Insurance Exchange, 
663 P.2d 93, 94 (Utah 1983) [denial appropriate because amendment would have 
delayed trial and substance of new claim was known a full year before amendment 
sought]; Harper v. Summit County, 963 P.2d 768, 779-80 (UT App. 1998), aff d and 
rev'd in part (on other grounds), 2001 UT 10, 26 P.3d 193 [amendment sought after 
discovery complete and partial summary judgment entered, completely new claim 
sought through amendment, and amendment would have delayed trial in case already 
pending two years]; Atcitty v. Board of Education, 967 P.2d 1261, 1264-65 (UT App. 
1998) [amendment sought to allege new issues, was sought two and a half months after 
discovery cutoff and after both parties had filed motions for summary judgment and 
plaintiff was aware of new issues long before request to amend]; Swift Stop, Inc. v. 
Wight, 845 P.2d 250, 253 (UT App. 1992) [movant aware of facts underlying 
amendment long before request to amend and no adequate reason given for delay]; 
Mountain America Credit Union v. McClellan, 854 P.2d 590, 592-93 (UT App. 1993), 
cert, denied, 862 P.2d 1356 (Utah 1993) [amendment sought two years after answer 
filed with no good reason given for delay and plaintiff would be prejudiced by having to 
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meet new cause of action]; Jones v. Salt Lake City Corp,, 2003 UT App. 355, 78 P.2d 
988, cert denied, 90 P.3d 1041 (2004) [amendment sought after cutoff date in 
scheduling order and movant knew of facts at the outset of the case]; Sneddon v. 
Graham, 821 P.2d 1185, 1189(UT App. 199 \ \ cert, denied, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1991) 
[amendment sought two years after action filed and one month before trial setting]. 
This is a clear case. The Trial Court properly denied the requests to amend. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED TESTIMONY 
CONCERNING HANDWRITING AND THAT THE SIGNATORIES 
DID NOT EXECUTE THE EASEMENT DOCUMENT 
The Trial Court did not commit error in admitting the testimony of George 
Throckmorton ("Throckmorton") and John Ashton, David Carter and Stuart Wentz (the 
"Children") that the grantors' signatures were not genuine. First appellants never 
objected to the testimony that they now claim was improperly introduced; indeed, they 
introduced some of it themselves. Second, appellants have failed to marshal the evidence 
with respect to this issue, which by itself is fatal to their appeal. Third, appellants have 
provided no competent evidence that Sharon Peterson was a "subscribing witness." 
Fourth, the Trial Court found that Sharon Peterson (now Davis)11 was not a "subscribing 
witness." In fact, the Trial Court so found despite having improperly admitted the 
quasi-habit evidence of Sharon Peterson upon which appellants place great weight. Fifth, 
the statutes cited by appellants do not prohibit the testimony of the Children. Finally, the 
nTo avoid confusion, Sharon Peterson (now Davis) will be identified as Sharon 
Peterson — the name under which she appeared as notary on the Easement Document. 
30 
statutes cited by Sykes are only recording requirements and should not be interpreted as 
limitations on evidence of forgery. 
A. Appellants failed to preserve this issue for appeal. 
Appellants assert that the Trial Court improperly admitted evidence from 
Throckmorton, a handwriting expert, and the Children to the effect that the signatures on 
the Easement Document were not authentic. "An objection to evidence not raised at trial 
will not be considered on appeal." Barson v. E. R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 682 P.2d 832, 
839 (Utah 1984). To be effective, an objection must be both timely and specific in order 
to give the trial court the opportunity to conduct the trial without hearing tainted evidence, 
thus avoiding reversal or retrial. Id. To the same effect, see 438 Main Street v. Easy 
Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, If 51, 99 P.3d SOI; Handle v. Allen, 862 P.2d 1329, 1338 (Utah 
1993); Dejavue, Inc. v. U.S. Energy Corp., 1999 UT App. 355, ffij 12-14, 993 P.2d 222, 
cert denied, 4 P.3d 1289 (Utah 2000). Appellants did not object - at all - to the 
introduction of that testimony at trial. John Ashton testified, without objection, that the 
signatures of his parents were not authentic. [T. 41-42]. David Carter, on examination by 
appellants' counsel testified that the signatures of his parents were not authentic. [T. 77-
78]. Sykes asked Stuart Wentz whether his parents' signatures appeared authentic. [T. 
1114-15].l2 George Throckmorton testified on direct examination with no objection that 
12Mr. Wentz testified that a signature of his father on a comparison document that 
had been proven to be authentic was not his father's signature and that his mother's 
signature on the Easement Document was not hers. [T. 317 and T. 1131-33]. Wentz 
explained that his father suffered a stroke and heart attack in December, 1976 and that 
thereafter he had great difficulty signing his name and that his mother signed his father's 
name thereafter. [T. 1135-36]. 
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all six signatures were simulated forgeries. [T. 303-330]. Both Sykes and counsel for the 
Sykes Trust and Frontier cross-examined Throckmorton on this subject. [T. 330-345; 
345-354]. 
Appellants' argument that the testimony of Throckmorton and the Children 
was improperly admitted fails because they did not preserve their objection at trial. In 
addition, by themselves eliciting this testimony from Carter and Wentz, they "opened the 
door" to that kind of evidence and cannot now complain of such testimony from them and 
the other witnesses. See, State v. Winward, 941 P.2d 627, 634 (UT App. 1997); State v. 
Speer, 750 P.2d 186, 192-93 (Utah 1988) (J. Durham concurrence). 
B. Appellants have not marshaled the evidence. 
To successfully challenge a trial court's findings, an appellant "must first 
marshal all the evidence in support of the finding and then demonstrate that the evidence 
is legally insufficient to support the finding even when viewing it in a light most 
favorable to the court below." Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82,1J 76, 100 P.3d 1177 
(internal quotations omitted). This requirement applies equally to fact-dependent legal 
rulings. See Id, at f^ 20 and f 76. To meet this burden, appellants must play devil's 
advocate, showing how the Court may have arrived at its ruling, and then argue how that 
ruling is contradicted by the clear weight of the evidence. See Id. at ffl[ 77-78. Appellants 
may not simply "re-argue the factual case presented in the trial court" and also cannot 
merely present carefully selected facts and excerpts from the record in support of his 
position. Id. at f^ 78. Furthermore, appellants cannot bypass their obligation by simply 
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claiming that no evidence exists to support the Trial Court's Ruling. Id. If the evidence is 
inadequately marshaled, the court assumes that all findings are adequately supported by 
the evidence. See Id. at J^ 19 and f 80. Appellants have categorically failed to meet this 
burden. First, appellants have largely presented only the evidence favorable to their 
position. Second, appellants have simply argued the position they took at trial, and have 
entirely failed to ,fplay devil's advocate" and attempt to justify the ruling they are 
appealing. Finally, appellants have attempted to shirk their burden of marshaling the 
evidence by incorrectly claiming that the Trial Court had no evidence on which to base its 
ruling. 
The following are only illustrative of the facts that appellants have ignored: 
The Trial Court found (and appellants do not challenge) that Peterson "could not state 
with certainty that she executed as notary the Easement Document and Quit Claim Deed, 
that she had no memory of notarizing those documents, and that she had no memory of 
the signatories executing them before her." [Findings, j^ 36(q)]. Peterson testified that 
she had "no memory whatsoever" of the Quit Claim Deed or Easement Document or the 
signatories signing same. [T. 1059-60]. How can one be a subscribing witness if one has 
"no memory whatsoever" of the execution of the document? Patricia Sykes saw blank 
notarizations executed by Peterson in Dwane Sykes' home office. [Findings, J^ 36(o)]. 
Appellants relied on Peterson's claimed invariable practice of not notarizing 
documents without picture identification and execution in her presence, but Peterson 
admitted on cross examination that approximately 10% of her notarizations were of 
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signatures that she never witnessed. [T. 1035, 1036, 1041]. Peterson signed an Affidavit 
for Sykes in this case that was, as she admitted at trial, false. She testified that she gave 
Sykes that Affidavit because she wanted to help him. See footnote 5, supra. The person 
who Dwane Sykes claimed drafted and arranged for the execution of the Easement 
Document, Hugh Vern Wentz, at the time "suffered serious health problems, couldn't 
drive a car, and was mentally and physically impaired." The Trial Court found it not 
credible that he drafted, executed, or circulated for signature the Easement Document. 
[Findings, f^ 36(i)]. At the time the Easement Document was purportedly executed by 
him, Wentz had suffered a heart attack and stroke, could barely sign his name, and his 
wife was signing documents for him. The Court's Findings in Paragraphs 36(a) through 
(q) catalog the mountain of evidence demonstrating that the six grantors did not and 
would not have executed the Easement Document. Appellants challenge none of those 
findings. 
C. Appellants have not provided any evidence that Sharon Peterson was a 
"subscribing witness.11 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-2-14 permits the introduction of "handwriting 
evidence11 if a "subscribing witness" is unavailable. A notary is only a "subscribing 
witness" if she "personally witnessed the execution of the questioned deed." Cazares v. 
Cosby, 2003 UT 3,120, 65 PJd 1184. It is appellants' burden to establish that Peterson 
personally witnessed the execution of the conveyances at issue. This they have 
completely failed to do. Peterson states time and again that she has no recollection of the 
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execution of the conveyances and does not remember whether the purported grantors 
signed it in her presence. In fact, she cannot even recall signing the acknowledgment, and 
only "thinks" that it is her signature that appears. 
Appellants make much out of Peterson's supposed "strict procedure" for 
acknowledging documents, but that testimony is legally insufficient, factually 
contradicted, and was not even properly admissible. The primary prerequisite for 
subscribing witness status is that Peterson must affirmatively testify that she witnessed 
the execution of the conveyance, as "the mere existence of an acknowledgment on an 
instrument raises no presumption that the notary was a witness." American General 
Home Equity, Inc. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 769 So.2d 508, 509 (Fla. App. 
2000). Peterson's "strict procedure" testimony is insufficient to meet this burden. In 
addition, the evidence shows that Peterson's "strict procedure" is not strict in any sense of 
the word. Patricia Sykes saw blank notarizations at her husband's house bearing 
Peterson's name. Peterson herself admitted that she notarized documents about 10% of 
the time without seeing the execution. Far from being competent evidence that Peterson 
personally witnessed the execution of the conveyances, this supposed "strict procedure" 
testimony does not even satisfy the requirements of the Utah Rules of Evidence for the 
introduction of "habit" evidence. 
The Utah Rules of Evidence permits introduction of "evidence of the habit 
of a person.. .to prove that the conduct of the person or organization on a particular 
occasion was in conformity with the habit." Utah R. Evid., 406. However, a "habit" is a 
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reflexive response to a particular kind of situation. See United States v. Rangel-Arreola, 
991 F.2d 1519, 1523 (10th Cir. 1993). Peterson's testimony of her "strict procedure" is 
both too irregular and volitional to be a "habit." Peterson does not always require a 
person to sign in her presence, but has certain exceptions that she applies. Those 
exceptions require her to think about how well she knows the person in question, and then 
make a determination about how she will respond. This is clearly not a "habit" as that 
term is used in Rule 406, and was inadmissible testimony. Plaintiffs timely and 
specifically objected to Peterson's testimony about her alleged habit. [T. 1003]. 
In short, appellants cannot point to a single piece of competent admissible 
evidence that Peterson personally witnessed the execution of the conveyances. This 
failure is fatal to appellants' arguments. 
D. The Trial Court found that Sharon Peterson was not a "subscribing 
witness." 
In this case, a reasonable review of the record can only lead to the 
conclusion that the Trial Court found that Peterson was not a subscribing witness. 
Appellate courts "uphold the trial court even if it failed to make findings on the record 
whenever it would be reasonable to assume that the court actually made such findings." 
State v. Pecht, 2002 UT 41, \ 22, 48 P.3d 931. In Cazares, the Supreme Court of Utah 
remanded to the Trial Court to determine whether a notary was a "subscribing witness" 
only in the circumstances "where it is not apparent from the record whether the 
acknowledging notary personally witnessed the execution of the questioned deed." 
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Cazares, 2003 UT 3 at ^ 20 (emphasis added). In this case, the record is replete with 
evidence that Peterson did not personally witness the execution of the conveyances at 
issue and, as described in Section C above, there is no competent evidence that she did. 
Clearly, if the signatures on the conveyances were forged, then Peterson could not have 
personally witnessed execution by the purported grantors. The Trial Court necessarily 
found that Peterson did not witness the grantors' signatures on the Easement Document. 
Appellants do not challenge that finding, but rather assume that because Peterson was 
identified as notary, she is necessarily a subscribing witness, which is not the case. 
E. Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-2-10 and 57-2-14 do not bar the Children's 
testimony. 
The Trial Court correctly admitted the testimony of the Children, as the 
statutes cited by Sykes by their terms do not apply to that testimony. Statutes, as well as 
rules of evidence, are construed in accordance with the plain meaning of the language 
used. See Butler v. Nay lor, 1999 UT 85, f 9, 987 P.2d 41; Nelson v. Salt Lake County, 
905 P.2d 872y 875 (Utah 1995). Utah Code Ann. § 57-2-14 (the "Handwriting Statute") is 
the only one of the two statutes cited by Sykes that prohibits any kind of testimony, and it 
very specifically precludes only "handwriting evidence." Utah Code Ann. § 57-2-10 (the 
"Subscribing Witness Statute") does not restrict the evidence that can be admitted, but 
simply requires the proponent of a conveyance to prove its execution by the testimony of 
a subscribing witness if one is available. The Subscribing Witness Statute is phrased in 
the positive, and reads as follows: 
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The proof of the execution of any conveyance whereby real estate is 
conveyed or may be affected shall be: (1) by the testimony of a 
subscribing witness, if there is one; or, (2) when all the subscribing 
witnesses are dead, or cannot be had, by evidence of the handwriting 
of the party, and of a subscribing witness, if there is one, given by a 
credible witness to each signature. 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-2-14 (emphasis added). No language in the statute can be read to 
bar any other type of evidence. The Court in Cazares recognized that the Handwriting 
Statute was a necessary corollary to the Subscribing Witness Statute in order to bar 
handwriting evidence. See Cazares, 2003 UT 3, f 17. The Handwriting Statute is 
focused solely on handwriting evidence. It states that: 
No proof by evidence of the handwriting of a party, or of the 
subscribing witness or witnesses, shall be taken unless the officer 
taking the same shall be satisfied that all the subscribing witnesses to 
such conveyance are dead, out of the jurisdiction, or cannot be had to 
prove the execution thereof. 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-2-14 (emphasis added). According to the plain meaning of the 
language used by the Legislature, this statute relates exclusively to handwriting evidence, 
and does not bar any other type of evidence. 
As well as violating rules of statutory construction, appellants' request that 
this Court widen the sweep of the Subscribing Witness Statute and the Handwriting 
Statute would result in bizarre and unjust results. Appellants' interpretation would mean 
that two criminals working together could forge documents that could not be challenged 
in court. So long as one conspirator were willing to testify that he or she was a 
subscribing witness to the conveyance, all other evidence of forgery would be barred. 
This includes testimony of the purported grantor that he/she did not sign the forged 
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document or testimony that the purported grantor could not have signed the document, 
such as, for example, that he was dead or out of the country at the time of the purported 
execution. This interpretation is contrary to the interests of justice as well as the plain 
language of the statute. 
The Trial Court's Findings in Paragraphs 36(a) through (o) establish 
circumstances relating to the purported execution of the conveyances, and why the 
purported grantors would not have executed those conveyances and acted inconsistently 
with the existence of such a conveyance. Only a tiny part of these circumstances was the 
Children's stating that the signatures on the Easement Document were not those of their 
parents. As none of this testimony is "handwriting evidence,'1 it is not barred by the 
Handwriting Statute and was properly admitted by the Trial Court. 
R Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-2-10 and 57-2-14 are properly construed as 
recording requirements, and not rules of evidence at trial. 
Properly construed, the Subscribing Witness Statute and Handwriting 
Statute are inapplicable to the types of evidence that can be received at trial. Those 
statutes are only recording requirements, and have no further significance than that. This 
is contrary to the holding of the Utah Supreme Court in Cazares, but is in fact consistent 
with the statutory scheme in which those code sections are found and with the law of 
other jurisdictions regarding subscribing witness statutes. See e,g. Webster Bank v. 
Flanagan, 725 A.2d 975, 980 (Conn. App. 1999) ("The subscribing witness requirement 
is redundant of the requirement for an acknowledgment, and serves no greater purpose 
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than an acknowledgment"). 
The statutes are found in Chapter 2 of Title 57, entitled "Acknowledg-
ments." Prior to its modification in 1983, that Chapter required "every conveyance in 
writing whereby any real estate is conveyed or may be affected shall be acknowledged or 
proved and certified in the manner hereinafter provided." Utah Code Ann. § 57-2-1 
(repealed in 1983). The Subscribing Witness Statute and Handwriting Statute outline 
some of the requirements for proving and certifying the execution of a conveyance. The 
Subscribing Witness Statute requires that "the proof of the execution" of a real estate 
conveyance be made by a subscribing witness, if one is available. The "subscribing 
witness" must be personally known by the "officer taking the proof." Utah Code Ann. § 
57-2-11. The subscribing witness must prove that the person who signed the document is 
the person described in the document, that such person executed the document, and that 
the subscribing witness signed the document as a witness at the request of the maker of 
the document. See Utah Code Ann. § 57-2-12. If the subscribing witness provides that 
proof, then the "officer taking the proof1 can make a "certificate of such proof." If no 
subscribing witnesses are available, the "proof of the execution" and a "certificate of 
proof can be made based upon handwriting evidence. See Utah Code Ann. § 57-2-14 
and 15. Such a certificate is one of the types of acknowledgment that is still required for 
recordation of a conveyance: 
A certificate of the acknowledgment of any document, or of the 
proof of the execution of any document, or a jurat as defined in 
Section 46-1-2, or other notarial certificate containing the words 
"subscribed and sworn" or their substantial equivalent, that is signed 
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and certified by the officer taking the acknowledgment, proof, or 
jurat as provided in this title, entitles the document and the certifi-
cate to be recorded in the office of the recorder of the county where 
the real property is located. 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-101(1) (emphasis added). This is the entire purpose of the 
Subscribing Witness Statute and Handwriting Statute, and they were never intended by 
the Legislature to affect the types of evidence admissible at a trial on the issue whether a 
document is a forgery. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY INVALIDATED 
THE EASEMENT DOCUMENT FOR A LACK OR 
FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION 
Plaintiff Ashton's Motion for Summary Judgment dated September 19, 2001 was 
granted because none of Sykes, George, or Frontier had standing and because the 
evidence before the Court established that no consideration was given for the Easement 
Document. The Court in its Ruling reasoned that conveyance of an easement required 
consideration, that the Easement Document was given to Sykes, Dennis Sykes, and 
Frontier as Grantees, but "none of them gave consideration for the transaction." The 
Trial Court stated: 
In his deposition Sykes testified that he did not give any 
consideration for the deed and that he knew of no consideration 
supporting the deed of easement. While he no longer has any 
ownership interest in any of the land, he was an original grantee 
under the deed of easement and was an officer of Frontier, another 
of the grantees. As well, Dennis Sykes, the only remaining grantee, 
has released any claim to an ownership of the easement, thus 
demonstrating that he did not consider the easement valid. In his 
deposition, Sykes testified that he assumed that nominal 
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consideration, like $10.00, had been paid for the easement, but that 
he did not really know. Certainly he cannot build an entire case out 
of an assumption. Sykes also assumed Mr. Wentz took care of 
giving consideration. This last claim, however, is meritless. Wentz 
was one of the grantors. Grantors do not give consideration for a 
deed, grantees do. [R. 1471-73]. 
Included in the Appendix at Tab B are pages 60-62 of Volume I of the deposition of 
Dwane Sykes, which contains all of his testimony on this subject. It states that no one 
was involved in the execution of the Easement Document other than the Ashtons, the 
Carters, the Wentzes, Ms. Peterson [the alleged notary], and Sykes, that Sykes himself 
gave no consideration, and that Sykes "assumed" that grantors received nominal 
consideration — "something like $10." The only grantees under the Easement 
Document were (1) Dennis Sykes, (2) Dwane Sykes, and (3) Frontier International. 
(1) Dennis Sykes did not even know about the Easement Document until more than 20 
years after it was purportedly executed. [Findings, ^ 36(n)]. That left only (2) Dwane 
Sykes and (3) Frontier as grantees who may have given consideration, and Sykes 
testified that he knew of no consideration being given. As the Trial Court observed, 
Dwane Sykes testified that he was an officer of Frontier who handled the Easement 
Document transaction. That eliminates all of the grantees as parties who may have 
given consideration. Sykes' statements that Wentz had some involvement and he 
"assumed" that Wentz may have had some involvement in giving consideration does not 
change things for two reasons: First, Sykes testified that he really didn't know what 
Wentz did and, as the Trial Court observed in its Ruling, second, Wentz was a grantor, 
not a grantee, and was not in a position to give consideration. 
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The law is clear that a conveyance of interest in real estate, including an 
easement, requires consideration. See Potter v. Chadaz, 977 P.2d 533, 536 (UT App. 
1999); Green v. Stansfield, 886 P.2d 117, 122 (UT App. 1994). That the deed recited 
that $10 and other consideration was given does not establish that consideration was 
given. As the Court held in Miller v. Archer, 749 P.2d 1274 (UT App. 1988), cert. 
denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988), recitals in instruments of transfer are customary and 
do not establish that consideration was actually given. 
Appellants' Brief at page 39 suggests that Sykes also gave consideration in the 
form of maintenance of the Ashton property. That is not accurate. First, no such 
evidentiary material was supplied to the Trial Court in connection with any Motion for 
Summary Judgment. Second, Dwane Sykes never testified that he performed 
maintenance as consideration. Third, Dwane Sykes5 deposition at pp. 253-58, which is 
the only evidentiary support advanced by appellants, which is included here under Tab 
C of the Appendix, establishes only that Sykes' then-attorney, one Sherman Hibbert, 
instructed Sykes how to perfect adverse possession of a large part of the Ashton Parcel 
and that in an effort to obtain title to the Ashton Parcel by adverse possession, Sykes 
performed various maintenance, spraying, clearing, cutting and stacking wood, etc. A 
party's bad-faith efforts to obtain title to another's property by adverse possession 
cannot by any stretch constitute consideration for a purchase of an easement on that 
same property. 
Appellants' consideration argument highlights the bizarre, preposterous nature of 
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this case. They argue that $10 consideration adequately supports the transfer of a 
burdensome easement, 66 feet in width, comprising over four acres in area [Ex. 19; T. 
101-05], which was given by Carters through their own house and was purportedly 
given by both Ashtons and Carters, who despised Sykes. The appellants cite Bailoran-
Judge Trust Co. v. Carr, 218 P. 138, 139 (Utah 1923), for the proposition that a 
conveyance based on inadequate consideration will not be set aside "unless inadequacy 
is so great as to shock the conscience and furnish of itself evidence of fraud." Plaintiffs 
could not have said it better. Apart from the fact that clearly no one in their right mind 
would grant an easement covering over four acres of property, which destroyed the 
value of their property and destroyed their house (all of which is further evidence of 
Dwane Sykes' forgery), as a matter of law, disparity in "value" between that 
burdensome easement and $10 should shock the conscience of anyone. 
The Trial Court's ruling that the Easement Document is invalid for lack of 
consideration is supported by the record, no contrary evidence is offered, and is 
independently supported by the Trial Court's alternative findings (i) after trial that the 
Easement Document was invalid because it was a forgery and (ii) based upon the Trial 
Court's earlier Order granting partial summary judgment in favor of Berkshires dated 
August 22, 2001, the Easement Document was invalid as to the Carter Parcel. 
CONCLUSION 
Each of the Trial Court's rulings under attack was correct. This Court should 
affirm and award plaintiffs their costs. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of June, 2005. 
'A. Maak, Of Counsel 
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellees 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE BERKSHIRES, L C , a Utah Limited 
Liability Company, PEPJAANS I, a General 
Partnership, PEACO, LTD , a Limited 
Partnership, and PATRICK W ASHTON, ) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiffs, ) 
vs ) 
) Civil No 000402143 
DENNIS L SYKES,DWANEJ SYKES, ) 
FRONTIER INTERNATIONAL LAND ) Judge GaryD Stott 
CORPORATION, an Alaska Corporation, ) 
PAUL J YOUNG, BENOY and ANGELA ) 
TAMANG, as Trustees of a Trust, MARK A ) 
SYKES, WILLIAM CHRISTIANSEN, ) 
ANGELA TAMANG, as Trustee of a Trust, ) 
UNIVERSITY AVENUE DEVELOPMENT ) 
ASSOCIATES, a Utah Limited Partnership, ) 
B DIANE GEORGE d/b/a GB INVEST- ) 
MENTS, COTTONWOOD SUNDANCE ) 
CORPORATION, an entity corporation, ) 
PATRICIA SYKES, CSD EQUITIES, an ) 
entity, and ALLEN P PACK, ) 
Defendants 
This action came on regularly for trial before the Honorable Gary D. Stott, District Judge, 
and was tried to the Court on June 17, 18, and 19, 2003 and October 6, 7, and 8, 2003. The 
Court previously limited the issues to be tried to those addressed as Counts VIII, IX, and X of 
plaintiffs' Complaint and defendants' claim of boundary by acquiescence in their Counterclaim. 
Plaintiffs The Berkshires, L.C., a Utah limited liability company ("Berkshires"), Pepjaans, a 
general partnership, PEACO, Ltd., a limited partnership, and Patrick W. Ashton (collectively, 
"Ashton Group") were represented by Bruce A. Maak. Defendant Dwane J. Sykes represented 
himself. Defendant Frontier International Land Corporation, an Alaska corporation ("Frontier") 
and Benoy Tamang and Angela Tamang and their successor, EL. Roy Duce, as trustees of a trust 
for the benefit of the children of Dwane and Patricia Sykes ("Sykes Trust") were represented by 
Samuel A. Primavera, Esq. The action having been tried to a conclusion, and the Court 
having heard and considered the evidence, the parties' memoranda and arguments, and the 
Court having previously issued its Memorandum Decision herein, now finds the following 
facts: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
A. Plaintiffs' Claims Against Defendants 
The Properties in Question 
1. Berkshires owns fee title to the parcels of real property located in Utah County 
described on Exhibit "A" hereto, which were purchased from David and Helen Carter (the 
"Carter Parcel"). 
2. Berkshires now owns fee title to the tract of land located in Utah County, State of 
Utah more particularly described on Exhibit "B" hereto, which was purchased from the Ashton 
Group (the "Ashton Parcel"). 
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3. Plaintiffs caused to be recorded a Notice of Pendency of Action (Lis Pendens) 
herein on June 30, 2000. That Lis Pendens described and identified, among others, the tracts 
described below as the North Parcel, Center Parcel, South Parcel, and Corner Parcel. 
4. As of June 30, 2000, Paul J. Young and the Sykes Trust each appeared as record 
owners of an undivided 50% interest in the tract of land described on Exhibit "C" hereto (the 
"Center Parcel"). 
5. As of June 30, 2000, University Avenue Development Associates, as to an 
undivided 91% interest and GB Investments (which is a name under which B. Diane George does 
business) as to an undivided 9% interest appeared as record owners of the tract of land described 
on Exhibit "D" hereto (the "Corner Parcel") excepting the South 1 foot of the East 1 foot thereof. 
As of June 30, 2000, Cottonwood Sundance Corporation as to an undivided 91% interest and GB 
Investments as to an undivided 9% interest appeared as record owners of the South 1 foot of the 
East 1 foot of the Corner Parcel. 
6. As of June 30, 2000, Mark A. Sykes and William Christiansen appeared as record 
owners of the tract of land described on Exhibit "E" hereto (the "North Parcel"). 
7. As of June 30, 2000, the Sykes Trust appeared as record owner of the tract of land 
described on Exhibit "F" hereto (the "South Parcel"), and CSD Equities and Allen P. Pack 
appeared of record to hold an encumbrance against the South Parcel. 
8. The approximate relative locations of the Carter Parcel, the Ashton Parcel, the 
Center Parcel, the Corner Parcel, the North Parcel, and the South Parcel are depicted on Exhibit 
"G" hereto. 
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The Berkshires's Proposed Development and the Easement Document 
9. Berkshires contracted to purchase the Carter Parcel and the Ashton Parcel from the 
Carters and the Ashton Group for the purpose of developing a high-end residential subdivision. 
10. After Berkshires contracted to purchase the Carter Parcel and the Ashton Parcel, 
but before the closing of those transactions, Dwane Sykes, representing himself to be the 
representative of the Sykes Trust and Frontier, actively opposed Berkshires's efforts to secure 
Orem City approvals for its proposed residential subdivision project. In all of his dealings with 
Orem City, Dwane Sykes purported to act on behalf of Frontier and Sykes Trust. 
11. Hours before the closing of Berkshires's purchase of the Carter Parcel, Dwane 
Sykes recorded with the Utah County Recorder the following two documents: 
(i) "Grant of Right-of-Way Easements," which was dated June 1, 1977 and 
was recorded on November 30, 1999 as Entry No. 125155 in Book 5287 at Page 515 (the 
"Easement Document"), and 
(ii) "Quit Claim Deed," which was dated October 9, 1976 and was recorded 
November 30, 1999 as Entry No. 125156 in Book 5287 at Page 520 (the "Quit Claim 
Deed"). 
12. At the time of recordation of the Easement Document and Quit Claim Deed on 
November 30, 1999, ownership of the various relevant parcels of land was as follows: 
Center Parcel: Paul J. Young and Sykes Trust. 
Corner Parcel: University Avenue Development, Cottonwood Sundance 
Corporation, and Jerry Nordmeyer. 
North Parcel: William Christiansen. 
South Parcel: Sykes Trust. 
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13. The Easement Document purported to bear as the grantors' signatures the 
signatures of P.E. Ashton, Eleanor L. Ashton, Hugh Vern Wentz, Evelyn G Wentz, Ralph L. 
Carter, and Elva B. Carter, all of whom were previous owners of the Carter Parcel and the Ashton 
Parcel. The Easement Document recited that it was executed in 1977. The Quit Claim Deed 
purported to bear the signatures of Hugh Vern Wentz and Evelyn G. Wentz and recited that it was 
executed in 1976. As of the date of recording of the Easement Document and Quit Claim Deed 
on November 30, 1999, P.E. Ashton, Eleanor L. Ashton, Hugh Vern Wentz, Evelyn G Wentz, 
Ralph L. Carter, and Elva B. Carter were all deceased. 
14. The Easement Document purported to create burdensome easements traversing 
large areas of Carter Parcel and the Ashton Parcel. The Easement Document purported to create 
an easement through the center of the Carters' house. The Easement Document purported to 
create a large right-of-way, 66 feet in width, that comprised several acres of area on the Ashton 
Parcel. The easements purportedly created by the Easement Document rendered large portions of 
the Carter Parcel and Ashton Parcel unusable for subdivision purposes. 
15. Dwane Sykes brought to the attention of Orem City the Easement Document to 
frustrate Berkshires's effort to seek Orem City approvals for its proposed subdivision. 
16. As of the time that Dwane Sykes brought the Easement Document to the attention 
of Orem City, Orem City regarded Berkshires as having met all requirements for final approval of 
its proposed subdivision, which included both the Carter Parcel and the Ashton Parcel. 
17. At the time of recordation of the Easement Document, Dwane Sykes, individually, 
did not own any interest in any of the North Parcel, Corner Parcel, Center Parcel, or South Parcel. 
The only parties benefitted by the Easement Document were owners of one or more of those 
parcels. Those parties included William Christiansen, Sykes Trust, and University Avenue 
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Development. William Christiansen and University Avenue Development have by Stipulation in 
this action disclaimed any interest in the Easement Document. 
18. As a direct result of Dwane Sykes's recordation of the Easement Document, Orem 
City withheld approval of those portions of the proposed subdivision that were affected by the 
easements created by the Easement Document. That action on the part of Orem City in turn 
forced Berkshires to have its engineering firm revise its proposed subdivision plat so as to remove 
from the plat the areas affected by the Easement Document while concurrently submitting for 
approval only those areas not affected by the Easement Document in the proposed subdivision. 
19. The recordation of the Easement Document and its effects upon Berkshires's 
securing subdivision approvals delayed Berkshires's project and delayed the sale of lots from 
Berkshires's subdivision project. 
20. Shortly following Orem City's refusal to approve Berkshires's proposed 
subdivision because of the recordation of the Easement Document, Dwane Sykes met with 
representatives of Berkshires and communicated to them that he controlled the properties owned 
by the Sykes family (including the property owned by the Sykes Trust and any property owned by 
Frontier) and that he could make the Easement Document go away. He stated, however, that he 
would not make the Easement Document go away unless Berkshires conveyed to him or his 
entities approximately five lots in the proposed subdivision having a value in excess of 
$1,000,000.00. 
Dwane Sykes Relationship With Frontier 
21. At all material times, Dwane Sykes was an officer of Frontier. 
22. At all material times, Dwane Sykes was in total control of Frontier. 
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23. Dwane Sykes had actual and apparent authority to perform all of the acts that he 
purported to perform on behalf of Frontier as set forth above and below. 
Dwane Svkes's Relationship to the Sykes Trust 
24. The Sykes Trust is a trust that was created by Dwane Sykes and his then-wife 
Patricia Sykes for the benefit of their children Benoy and Angela Tamang were the trustees of 
the Sykes Trust until 1995, when E.L. Roy Duce became trustee. E.L. Roy Duce was the trustee 
of the Sykes Trust at the time of trial. E.L. Roy Duce at all material times was a citizen and 
resident of Canada. 
25. Dwane Sykes and Patricia Sykes caused to be conveyed to the Sykes Trust the 
Center Parcel and South Parcel 
26. The Sykes Trust has held record ownership of all or an undivided part of fee title to 
the Center Parcel and South Parcel since prior to 1982. Dwane Sykes claims to have lived on the 
Center Parcel based on an oral lease with the trust since approximately 1974. His lease was a 
sham. The Sykes Trust allowed Dwane Sykes to live on the Center Parcel for little and in some 
cases no rent. When rent was not paid, the trustee(s) of the Sykes Trust took no action against 
Dwane Sykes 
27. The trustees of the trust, Benoy and Angela Tamang ("Tamangs") and E.L. Roy 
Duce have had no significant involvement in controlling or managing the affairs of the Sykes 
Trust. They were generally not aware of transactions and activities affecting the Sykes Trust's 
property. The trustees of the trust consistently allowed Dwane Sykes to control substantially all 
of the affairs of the Sykes Trust. 
28 Dwane Sykes occupied the Sykes Trust's real property, maintained the Sykes 
Trust's real property, handled insurance issues for the Sykes Trust's property, kept trespassers off 
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of the Sykes Trust's property, put up signs around the Sykes Trust's property identifying the 
property as that of Dwane Sykes, collected trust income, deposited trust income in the Sykes 
Trust's account, handled zoning matters affecting the Sykes Trust's property, drafted legal 
documents for the Sykes Trust that were mechanically executed by the trustee of the Sykes Trust, 
and dealt with and engaged counsel for the Sykes Trust. The trustees did none of those things. 
29. The trustees of the Sykes Trust looked to Dwane Sykes to handle and manage the 
Sykes Trust's affairs without supervision, oversight, or need for prior approval. 
30. In fact and substance, Dwane Sykes has been allowed by the trustees to control and 
has in fact controlled the Sykes Trust and its affairs, particularly as it relates to the real property at 
issue in this action. 
31. The Sykes Trust and its trustees allowed Dwane Sykes to purport to act for it in 
substantially all of its affairs and did nothing to dissuade others from believing that Dwane Sykes 
was, in fact, authorized to act on behalf of the Sykes Trust. 
32. The Sykes Trust and its trustees never made known to any party relevant to this 
action that there were any limitations on Dwane Sykes's authority to bind the Sykes Trust or to act 
on its behalf. 
33. The Sykes Trust and its trustees never repudiated any action that Dwane Sykes 
took or purported to take on behalf of the Sykes Trust with respect to his dealings with Orem 
City, with Berkshires, and his recordation of the Easement Document. 
34. The trustees of the Sykes Trust expressly authorized Dwane Sykes to act on behalf 
of the Sykes Trust as its agent with respect to all matters relating to the Center Parcel and the 
South Parcel. 
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The Easement Document and Quit Claim Deed Were Forged by Dwane Sykes 
35. The Easement Document and Quit Claim Deed were purportedly executed in the 
mid 1970s but were not recorded over 22 years later, after all of the purported grantor-signatories 
to those documents were dead. 
36. Dwane Sykes forged all of the signatures of P.E. Ashton, Eleanor L. Ashton, Hugh 
Vern Wentz, Evelyn G. Wentz, Ralph L. Carter, and Elva B. Carter as they appear on the 
Easement Document and Quit Claim Deed. That finding is based upon the following facts, 
among others: 
(a) All six signatures on the Easement Document and the two signatures on the 
Quit Claim Deed were signed using the same pen. 
(b) Both the Quit Claim Deed and the Easement Document were typed on the 
same typewriter at the same time. 
(c) George Throckmorton, an eminent handwriting expert, testified that all six 
signatures are in all likelihood simulated forgeries. 
(d) P.E. Ashton did not like Dwane Sykes, and it makes no sense that he 
would grant a burdensome easement to Sykes or his entities over several acres of his 
property for just ten dollars, as claimed by Dwane Sykes. 
(e) P.E. and Eleanor Ashton always consulted with their son, John Ashton, 
regarding legal matters, but they never consulted with him about the Easement Document. 
The signatures of P.E. Ashton and Eleanor L. Ashton did not appear genuine to John 
Ashton, their son, who was familiar with their signatures. 
(f) Ralph Carter did not like Dwane Sykes. It makes no sense that Ralph 
Carter would, for almost no consideration, give Dwane Sykes a right-of-way, particularly 
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one that went through the middle of his house and barn. Years after the right-of-way was 
purportedly given, Dwane Sykes asked Ralph Carter for an easement over the same area. 
Years after the Easement Document was purportedly executed, Dwane Sykes attempted to 
pass over the easement area, but Ralph Carter blocked his access and would not allow him 
access. 
(g) Dwane Sykes, who is sophisticated in the real estate area, did not, 
according to his testimony, record the Easement Document for approximately 22 years 
after it was purportedly executed, and when he did so, he did it just hours before 
Berkshires's closing on the purchase of the Carter Parcel. His explanation for the delay 
was contradictory and not credible. 
(h) On the date that the Easement Document was purportedly executed, both 
Dwane and Patricia Sykes owned the Center Parcel and South Parcel, which were parcels 
benefitted by the Easement Document. As a person sophisticated in real estate, Dwane 
Sykes knew that Patricia Sykes, as an owner of the parcels purportedly benefitted by the 
Easement Document, should have been included as a grantee, but she was not included. 
(i) Hugh Vern Wentz was a Judge and lawyer who would know that, after he 
gave the Quit Claim Deed, he was not a necessary signatory to the Easement Document, 
which granted easements only over land included within the Quit Claim Deed. At the time 
of the purported execution of the Easement Document, Hugh Vern Wentz had suffered 
serious health problems, couldn't drive a car, and was mentally and physically impaired. It 
is not credible that he drafted and executed the Easement Document and Quit Claim Deed 
and circulated them for signature, as Dwane Sykes claims. 
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(j) Dwane Sykes, who actively opposed Berkshires's subdivision approval for 
a long period of time, did not mention the existence of the Easement Document for 
months. In October, 1999, he asked Orem City to condition Berkshires's subdivision 
approval on Berkshires's giving rights-of-way to the Sykes's parcels, which is inconsistent 
with the pre-existence of the Easement Document, which granted rights-of-way over the 
same areas. 
(k) In meetings with Berkshires representatives just a few weeks before 
November 30, 1999, Dwane Sykes did not mention any written or express easement, but 
instead claimed that the Sykes family owned a prescriptive easement over the areas over 
which an express easement was granted by the Easement Document. 
(1) Dwane Sykes told Berkshires after November 30, 1999 that he had seen the 
signatories execute the Easement Document, while at trial he testified that he had not. 
(m) No one other than Dwane Sykes saw the Easement Document or Quit 
Claim Deed in the approximately 22 years between their execution and their recordation. 
Diane George, who is or was the spouse of Dwane Sykes, was not credible when she 
testified that she saw the Easement Document prior to November, 1999. The Court finds 
that she did not even attend the meeting at which she claimed to have seen the Easement 
Document and she claimed at that meeting to have seen a survey that did not yet exist at 
the time of the meeting. 
(n) Dennis Sykes, a shareholder and officer of Frontier who, along with Dennis 
Sykes himself, were named grantees under the Easement Document and Quit Claim Deed, 
never saw either document and was completely unaware of their existence until after this 
action was filed. 
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(o) Patricia Sykes, Dwane Sykes's former wife, who was secretary of Frontier 
and intimately involved in all real property dealings of the Sykes family and their entities, 
never saw or heard about the Easement Document or the Quit Claim Deed prior to the 
filing of this action. Her relationship to the Sykes family's real property dealings was such 
that she would have known of the existence of the Easement Document and Quit Claim 
Deed had they existed at the time they were purportedly executed and thereafter. Patricia 
Sykes saw blank notarizations executed by Sharon Peterson, the purported Notary of the 
Easement Document, in Dwane Sykes's home office in the late 1970s. 
(p) Mark Sykes, the son of Dwane Sykes, was completely unaware of any 
dealings with the Carters or Ashtons regarding a right-of-way and did not see and was not 
aware of the Easement Document or Quit Claim Deed until after this action was filed. 
(q) The purported Notary on the Easement Document and Quit Claim Deed, 
Sharon Peterson, testified that she could not state with certainty that she executed as 
notary the Easement Document and Quit Claim Deed, that she had no memory of 
notarizing those documents, and that she had no memory of the signatories executing them 
before her. 
The Svkes's Trust and Frontiers Conduct as Concerns the Easement Document 
37. The Easement Document recites that the grantees or recipients of the rights granted 
thereunder are Dwane Sykes, Dennis Sykes, and Frontier. 
38. The only land purportedly benefitted by the Easement Document is the North 
Parcel, South Parcel, Corner Parcel, and Center Parcel. As of November 30, 1999, when the 
Easement Document was recorded by Dwane Sykes, the North Parcel was owned by William 
Christiansen, the South Parcel was owned by Sykes Trust, the Center Parcel was owned by Sykes 
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Trust and Paul J. Young, and the Corner Parcel was owned by University Avenue Development, 
Jerry Nordmeyer, and Cottonwood Sundance Corporation. Mark Sykes (who succeeded to 
ownership of the North Parcel), William Christiansen, and University Avenue Development 
disclaimed any interest in the Easement Document prior to trial. The defaults of Paul J. Young, 
B. Diane George (who succeeded to ownership of the interest of Nordmeyer), and Cottonwood 
Sundance Corporation have been entered. The only party that could benefit from the Easement 
Document and which was not in default or has not disclaimed an interest in the Easement 
Document, is the Sykes Trust. 
39. Dwane Sykes recorded the Easement Document for Sykes Trust to benefit the 
property of Sykes Trust, on which he lives. 
40. Since November 30, 1999, the Sykes Trust has made use of the easements 
purportedly granted by the Easement Document. 
41. The Sykes Trust learned of Berkshires's assertion that the Easement Document was 
forged and was recorded to slander Berkshires's title when Sykes Trust was served with process in 
this action. 
42. The Complaint in this action alleged that if the Sykes Trust did not disaffirm the 
Easement Document, it would be liable for the damages suffered by Berkshires as a result of the 
Easement Document. 
43 The Sykes Trust has actively defended this action and asserted in this action that 
the Easement Document is valid, not a forgery, and that the Sykes Trust is entitled to the benefit 
of the easements purportedly granted by the Easement Document. 
44. Dwane Sykes asserted to representatives of Orem City and Berkshires that he was 
acting on behalf of the Sykes Trust in opposing the Berkshires development and in dealing with 
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Berkshires concerning the Easement Document. Dwane Sykes asserted to Berkshires that he, on 
behalf of Sykes Trust, was empowered to and authorized to cause the Easement Document to be 
released from the property it purportedly encumbered. 
45. The Sykes Trust has never disavowed the agency of Dwane Sykes, which Dwane 
Sykes asserted to Berkshires and to Orem City. 
46. Rather, the Sykes Trust has, in this litigation and otherwise, ratified and affirmed 
that agency. 
Slander of Title 
47. Dwane Sykes recorded and published the Easement Document, which contained 
false and slanderous statements disparaging the title to the Carter Parcel and the Ashton Parcel. 
48. The statements contained in the Easement Document that easements had been 
granted as prescribed therein over the Carter Parcel and the Ashton Parcel were false statements. 
49. Dwane Sykes published the Easement Document with malice. Dwane Sykes did so 
with the express intent to injure, vex, annoy, and blackmail Berkshires and Ashton Group. Dwane 
Sykes's recordation of the Easement Document was also accomplished under circumstances that 
Dwane Sykes should reasonably foresee might result in damage to Berkshires and the Ashton 
Group. 
50. Dwane Sykes's publication of the false statements in the Easement Document 
caused the approval of Berkshires's subdivision project to be delayed and Berkshires's acquisition 
of the Ashton Parcel to be delayed and rendered more expensive, and caused Berkshires's 
development of its subdivision to be delayed and pursued in reformatted phases. Berkshires as a 
result suffered special damages in the form of increased carrying costs, interest, taxes, and 
engineering costs, as well as necessarily incurring attorney's fees to free their property from the 
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forged Easement Document. Dwane Sykes's publication of the false statements in the Easement 
Document caused Ashton Group to be specially damaged by delaying the closing of Berkshires's 
purchase of the Ashton Parcel and by necessarily incurring attorney's fees to free their property 
from the forged Easement Document. 
Interference With Economic Relations 
51. Dwane Sykes intentionally interfered with Berkshires's and Ashton Group's 
existing and potential economic relations by recording the Easement Document. Dwane Sykes 
both actually intended such interference and knew objectively that such interference was 
substantially certain to occur as a result of his actions. Berkshires's existing economic relations 
that were interfered with included its agreement to purchase the Ashton Parcel and Carter Parcel 
and Orem City's informal approval of its subdivision. Berkshires's potential economic relations 
that were interfered with included final subdivision approval by Orem City and development and 
sale of lots within its proposed subdivision. Ashton Group's existing economic relations that were 
interfered with included its executory contract to sell the Ashton Parcel to Berkshires. 
52. Dwane Sykes intentionally interfered with Berkshires's and Ashton Group's 
economic relations for an improper purpose — Dwane Sykes recorded the Easement Document to 
create purported but false easements to benefit the Sykes Trust's property, to coerce Berkshires 
and/or Ashton Group to pay him money to remove the forged Easement Document, to frustrate 
Berkshires's legitimate development of its property and/or to frustrate Berkshires's purchase from 
the Ashton Group of the Ashton Parcel. Dwane Sykes interfered with Berkshires's economic 
relations using improper means. Those means included the forging of the Easement Document 
and its recordation and his false advice to Orem City that his family owned the easements granted 
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therein, all of which actions constitute violations of statutes and recognized common law 
principles. 
53. Dwane Sykes's interference with Berkshires's economic relations caused the 
approval of Berkshires's subdivision project to be delayed and Berkshires's acquisition of the 
Ashton Parcel to be delayed and rendered more expensive, and Berkshires's development of its 
subdivision to be delayed and pursued in reformatted phases. Berkshires as a result suffered 
increased carrying costs, interest, taxes, and engineering costs, as well as necessarily incurring 
attorney's fees to free their property from the forged Easement Document. Dwane Sykes's 
interference with Ashton Group's economic relations caused Ashton Group to be damaged by 
necessarily incurring attorney's fees to free their property from the forged Easement Document. 
Vicarious Liability of Frontier and Sykes Trust 
54. Frontier is liable to plaintiffs for Dwane Sykes's actions as set forth above because 
Dwane Sykes acted and purported to act on behalf of Frontier, and Dwane Sykes had actual and 
apparent authority, as an officer of Frontier, to bind Frontier. 
55. Sykes Trust is liable to plaintiffs for Dwane Sykes's actions as set forth above 
because (i) Sykes Trust granted to Dwane Sykes authority to control the Sykes Trust's affairs 
generally without prior authorization, (ii) Dwane Sykes in fact and substance was allowed by its 
trustees to control and he did in fact control the Sykes Trust, (iii) the trustees, by allowing Dwane 
Sykes to act as he did and allowing him to control the Sykes Trust and perform virtually all 
business and functions with respect to the Sykes Trust, granted to Dwane Sykes apparent authority 
to act on behalf of the Sykes Trust as he did in this case, (iv) Sykes Trust, after it became aware of 
the Easement Document and the assertion that the same was a forgery, did nothing to repudiate the 
Easement Document and Dwane Sykes's authority to act on behalf of Sykes Trust as he did, (v) 
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after recordation of the Easement Document, Sykes Trust affirmatively used the benefits 
purportedly granted by the Easement Document, and (vi) Sykes Trust asserted the validity and 
denied the invalidity of the Easement Document in this action and claimed the benefits granted by 
the Easement Document for the property owned by Sykes Trust in this action. 
Damages 
56. As a result of the slander of title and interference with economic relations by 
Dwane Sykes for which Sykes Trust and Frontier are jointly and severally liable, Berkshires 
suffered the following special damages: 
(a) Because of the recordation of the Easement Document, Berkshires was 
unable timely to close its purchase of the Ashton Parcel, but rather was reasonably 
required to enter into an Option, which required Berkshires to pay $271,000.00 to the 
Ashton Group as non-refundable option payments to preserve Berkshires's right to 
purchase the Ashton Parcel 
(b) The recordation of the Easement Document caused a period of delay in the 
Berkshiresfs project and the development, marketing, and sale of that project, between 
March 31, 2000 (the date on which the project would have been approved and available 
for marketing but for the recordation of the Easement Document) and June 1, 2001 (the 
date on which Phase I of the Berkshires's subdivision, which did not include the areas 
impacted by the Easement Document, was approved available for marketing). Because of 
this delay Berkshires incurred interest that it would not otherwise have incurred in the 
amount of $406,029.56. 
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(c) But for the recordation of the Easement Document and the delay it caused, 
Berkshires would not have been required to borrow funds from Central Bank. Berkshires 
had to pay Central Bank interest in the amount of $126,540.75 as a result of that delay. 
(d) Berkshires paid real property taxes for the period of delay in the amount of 
$3,611.85. 
(e) Berkshires paid increased engineering costs in the amount of $8,705.50 to 
Hubble Engineering to redesign the subdivision so as to subdivide the project in phases, 
which was necessitated by the recordation of the Easement Document. 
(f) Berkshires paid legal fees to the following parties and costs in the 
following-indicated amounts to successfully pursue an invalidation of the Easement 
Document as an encumbrance upon its property: 
Parsons, Behle & Latimer $2,488.00 
Don McCandless and other lawyers in his firm $26,000.00 
Bruce Maak and other lawyers in his firm $89,800.00 
Costs $8,541.25 
57. As a result of the slander of title and interference with economic relations by 
Dwane Sykes, for which Sykes Trust and Frontier are jointly and severally liable, Ashton Group 
suffered special damages in the amount of $50,000.00 for legal services paid to Prince, Yeates & 
Geldzahler in successfully invalidating the Easement Document as an encumbrance on the Ashton 
Parcel. 
58. The legal fees incurred as set forth in paragraphs 56(f) and 57 above were 
necessarily incurred to pursue the invalidation of the Easement document as an encumbrance 
against the properties owned by Berkshires and the Ashton Group and are reasonable in amount. 
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59. Berkshires suffered damages in the total amount of $942,716.91 as a result of the 
slander of title and interference with its economic relations as set forth above. 
60. The Ashton Group suffered damages in the total amount of $50,000.00 as a result 
of the slander of their title and interference with their economic relations as set forth above. 
Writ of Attachment 
61. This is an action upon and concerning an express or implied contract and/or an 
action against a non-resident of the State of Utah. 
62. Plaintiffs filed in this action the Affidavit of Matthew V. Parker which complies 
with the requirements of Rule 64C(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
63. Dwane Sykes and his various entities have assigned, disposed of, and concealed 
property with the intent to defraud creditors, and Dwane Sykes fraudulently contracted the debt or 
incurred the obligation with respect to which this action was brought, for which Frontier and 
Sykes Trust are also liable. 
64. Following the recordation of Lis Pendens in this action by plaintiffs, the following 
purported encumbrances and/or transfers of the property covered by the Writ of Attachment 
requested by plaintiffs have occurred, among others: 
(a) There was recorded a Trust Deed having EL. Roy Duce, Trustee, as 
Trustor and Frontier, as Beneficiary, which was recorded April 5, 2002 as Entry No. 
38655:2002. Any obligation secured by that Trust Deed has been paid. 
(b) There was recorded a Quit Claim Deed having B. Diane George, as 
Grantor, and Frontier as Grantee, which was recorded on July 1, 2002 as Entry No. 
74432:2002 Dwane Sykes forged B. Diane George's name on that instrument, and it is a 
nullity. 
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B. Defendants' Claims Against Plaintiffs 
Boundary by Acquiescence 
65. Frontier and Dwane Sykes assert ownership of a triangular shaped piece of land 
generally lying along the Northerly portion of the boundary between the North Parcel and the 
Ashton Parcel. 
66. Frontier claimed to own the easterly portion of in the North Parcel, which is 
adjacent to the Ashton Parcel in this area. 
67. Prior to the year 2000, the entire North Parcel was owned by William Christiansen. 
68. There are of record in the office of the Utah County Recorder the following Deeds 
covering the indicated portions of the North Parcel 
(a) Quit Claim Deed having William Christiansen, as Grantor, and Mark A. 
Sykes, as Grantee, which was recorded on January 18, 2000 as Entry No. 4503:2000 
covering the North Parcel less approximately the easterly 59.2 feet. 
(b) Warranty Deed having William Christiansen, as Grantor, and Frontier, as 
Grantee, which was recorded on October 12, 2000 as Entry No. 80660:2000 covering the 
North Parcel. 
(c) Warranty Deed having William Christiansen, as Grantor, and Dennis L. 
Sykes and Frontier, as Grantee, which was recorded on October 12, 2000 as Entry No. 
80667:2000 covering the North Parcel and other property. 
(d) Quit Claim Deed having William Christiansen, as Grantor, and Mark A. 
Sykes, as Grantee, which was recorded on December 24, 2001 as Entry No. 135730:2001, 
covering the North Parcel. 
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69 Frontier claims ownership of some or all of the North Parcel based upon the deeds 
identified above in paragraph 68(b) and (c) The signature of the grantor in each of those deeds, 
William Christiansen, was forged Because each of those deeds was forged, neither was effective 
to pass title and, as a consequence, as of the present, Mark A Sykes owns all of the North Parcel 
and Frontier owns none of the North Parcel 
70 Because neither Dwane Sykes nor Frontier owns any portion of the North Parcel, it 
follows that neither Frontier nor Dwane Sykes are landowners adjoining the Ashton Parcel in the 
area of the claim of boundary by acquiescence 
71 Frontier and Dwane Sykes claim boundary by acquiescence up to a fence line in 
the area in question (the "Fence") 
72 Even assuming Dwane Sykes and/or Frontier owned the area West of the Fence, 
they did not occupy that area 
73 The parties on either side of the subject Fence did not regard the Fence as a 
boundary, but rather as a method of containing livestock 
74 Even assuming that Frontier and/or Dwane Sykes owned the area West of the 
Fence, there was no showing of any acquiescence in the fence line as a boundary for at least 20 
years One Hatch owned the area West of the boundary between approximately 1974 and 1983 
University Avenue Development Associates owned the same area in 1983 William Christiansen 
owned the area West of the disputed fence between approximately 1983 and 2000 William 
Christiansen did not regard the Fence as a boundary and made no claim of ownership outside his 
deed lines There was no evidence of Christiansen's predecessors regarding the Fence as a 
boundary or whether they occupied up to it 
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75. Dwane Sykes and Frontier have failed to carry their burden of establishing that the 
Fence was in its claimed location for 20 continuous years. 
No Personal Liability of Dwane Sykes 
76. Dwane Sykes has received a discharge in his own individual bankruptcy 
proceeding. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court now makes and enters the following 
Conclusions of Law: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Slander of Title 
1. Dwane Sykes published slanderous statements disparaging the titles of the Ashton 
Group and Berkshires to the Ashton Parcel and the Carter Parcel. 
2. The Easement Document was a false statement 
3. Dwane Sykes published the slanderous statements with malice. 
4. As a result of Dwane Sykes's publication of the slanderous statements, Berkshires 
suffered special damage in the amount of $942,716.91 and Ashton Group suffered special damage 
in the amount of $50,000.00. 
Interference with Economic Relations 
5. Dwane Sykes intentionally interfered with Berkshires's and the Ashton Group's 
existing and potential economic relations by forging and recording the Easement Document and 
advising Orem City of the existence of the Easement Document. 
6. Dwane Sykes so intentionally interfered for the improper purpose of preventing 
Berkshires from closing its purchase of the Carter Parcel and/or Ashton Parcel, preventing 
Berkshires from securing Orem City approval of its subdivision, preventing Berkshires from 
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developing and marketing lots in its proposed subdivision, and for the purpose of blackmailing 
Berkshires for over $1,000,000.00. 
7. Dwane Sykes so intentionally interfered by the improper means of forging and 
recording the Easement Document and of falsely advising Orem City that the Easement 
Document created the easements prescribed in it. 
8. As a result of Dwane Sykes's intentional interference with Berkshires's and the 
Ashton Group's existing and potential economic relations, Berkshires has suffered special damage 
in the amount of $942,716.91 and Ashton Group has suffered special damage in the amount of 
$50,000.00. 
Liability of Frontier and Svkes Trust 
9. Dwane Sykes had actual and apparent authority to act on behalf of Frontier as he 
did in slandering the title of and interfering with the existing and potential economic relations of 
Berkshires and the Ashton Group. 
10. Dwane Sykes had actual and apparent authority to act on behalf of the Sykes Trust 
as he did in slandering the titles of and interfering with the existing and potential economic 
relations of Berkshires and the Ashton Group. 
11. Sykes Trust empowered and allowed Dwane Sykes to manage and control its 
affairs. The trustees of Sykes Trust did not in any meaningfijl way manage or control the affairs 
of Sykes Trust. They allowed Dwane Sykes to deal with the Sykes Trust property as his own. 
That state of affairs either directly subjects Sykes Trust to liability for Dwane Sykes's slander of 
title and intentional interference or estops Sykes Trust from denying that Dwane Sykes had the 
authority of Sykes Trust to act as he did. 
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12. Sykes Trust and Frontier have ratified the actions of Dwane Sykes on their behalf 
in forging and recording the Easement Document and are therefore jointly and severally liable 
therefor. 
13. Frontier and Sykes Trust are estopped to deny that they authorized and/or ratified 
the actions of Dwane Sykes giving rise to liability because they each, after being informed that the 
Easement Document was forged, affirmatively asserted the validity of and actually used and 
claimed the benefit of the Easement Document. 
14. Frontier and Sykes Trust are jointly and severally liable to Berkshires for its 
special damages in the amount of $942,716.91 Frontier and Sykes Trust are jointly and severally 
liable to Ashton Group for its special damages in the amount of $50,000.00. 
15. Because Dwane Sykes has received a discharge in bankruptcy, he is not personally 
liable for his slander of title and interference with economic relations as set forth above. 
Writ of Attachment 
16. This is an action upon and concerning an express or implied contract and/or an 
action against a non-resident of the State of Utah. 
17. Berkshires and Ashton Group are and since the initiation of this action have been 
entitled to this Court's issuance of a Writ of Attachment attaching the following property as 
security for the satisfaction of the Judgment that is to be entered in this action: All of the Center 
Parcel, all of the South Parcel, an undivided 9% interest in Corner Parcel (excluding the South 1 
foot of the East 1 foot thereof) owned by B. Diane George d/b/a GB Investments and all of the 
South 1 foot of the East 1 foot of the Corner Parcel. 
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18. The Writ of Attachment to be issued relates back to June 30, 2000, which is the 
date upon which plaintiffs recorded their Lis Pendens in this action. Any encumbrance placed 
upon those parcels thereafter is junior and subordinate to such Writ of Attachment. 
19. Under the circumstances presently presented in this case, where the writ is being 
issued concurrently with the entry of Judgment, plaintiffs are entitled to the issuance of that Writ 
of Attachment without bond. 
Boundary by Acquiescence 
20. The entirety of the North Parcel is owned by Mark A. Sykes. 
21. The following Deeds purportedly executed by William Christiansen are forgeries 
and are void and of no effect: (i) Warranty Deed naming William Christiansen, as Grantor, and 
Frontier, as Grantee, which was recorded on October 12, 2000 as Entry No. 80660:2000, and (ii) 
Warranty Deed naming William Christiansen, as Grantor, and Dennis L. Sykes and Frontier, as 
Grantees, which was recorded on October 12, 2000 as Entry No. 80667:2000. 
22. Because Dwane Sykes and Frontier claim to be adjoining property owners based 
upon the forged deeds, they cannot establish that they are adjoining landowners with Berkshires 
and/or Ashton Group. 
23. The owner of the parcel West of the subject Fence line and his/its predecessors did 
not occupy up to the Fence. 
24. The adjoining property owners did not acquiescence in the Fence as a boundary for 
20 years. 
25. Dwane Sykes and Frontier failed to carry their burden of proving boundary by 
acquiescence in this case, and Berkshires and Ashton Group are entitled to a dismissal with 
prejudice of that claim 
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MADE AND ENTERED this ^S day of 6 2004. 
BY THE COURT: 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW was served this ^ day of March, 2004 by mailing on said date copies thereof by 
United States mail, first class postage prepaid, addressed to: 
Dwane J. Sykes 
1511 South Carterville Road 
Orem, UT 84097-7244 
Samuel A. Primavera, Esq. 
Attorney for Frontier International Land Corp., 
and Benoy and Angela Tamang 
600 East 3400 North 
Provo, UT 84604 
B. Diane George d/b/a GB Investments 
644 North 450 West 
Orem, UT 84097 
Paul J. Young 
489 South 1650 East 
Springville, UT 84663 
Paul J. Young 
14 Daisy Meadow Terrace 
Henderson, NV 89014 
Justin D. Heideman, Esq. 
ASCIONE HEIDEMAN & McKAY 
Attorneys for Dwane J. Sykes, Frontier International 
Land Corporation, Sykes Trust, CSD Equities, and 
Cottonwood Sundance Corporation 
2969 N. University Ave., Suite 180 
Provo, UT 84604 
Jo$ne M Hughes 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
(Carter Parcel) 
The following described land located in Utah County, State of Utah: 
Commencing at a point located North 88°12'37" East along the section line 
1847.01 feet and South 7.55 feet from the Northwest corner of Section 25, 
Township 6 South, Range 2 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North 
89°25'00M East along a fence line 219.29 feet; thence North 89o36,00w East along 
a fence line 212.62 feet; thence South 33°52'00" East along a fence line 90.69 
feet; thence South 05°27'00" East along a fence line 591.67 feet; thence East 
along a fence line 150.36 feet; thence South 36°35'00" East along a fence line 
147.69 feet; thence South 29°4V00" West 265.60 feet; thence South 06o23'27" 
East 273.52 feet; thence North 88°39'15M East 284.88 feet; thence South 
03°36'0r East along a fence line 408.61 feet; thence North 76°24'13M West along 
a fence line 295.21 feet; thence South 05° 13'30" East 223.06 feet; thence North 
88°58'30M East 153.77 feet; thence South 07°29*00" East along a fence line 490.25 
feet; thence South 06°48"00" East along a fence line 272.36 feet; thence North 
83°40'00" West along a fence line 602.01 feet; thence North 23°47'00M West 
144.01 feet; thence North 06°56'00" East 70.89 feet; thence North 16°38'00" West 
67.57 feet; thence North Ol^'OO" East 129.41 feet; thence North 13°01'00" East 
83.42 feet; thence North 07°29'00" West 192.41 feet; thence South 89°04,56H 
West 91.13 feet; thence North 19.47 feet; thence North 89°43'0O" West 37.82 
feet; thence North 03°44'30" West along a fence line 132.94 feet; thence North 
00°09'30" East along a fence line 282.42 feet; thence South 88°26'55M West along 
a fence line 197.78 feet; thence South 89°42'15" West along a fence line 171.80 
feet; thence North 07o01'32M East 84.21 feet; thence North 88°52'3r East 154.50 
feet; thence North 04o24,05n East 81.88 feet; thence East 59.00 feet; thence North 
14°25'00M East 133.13 feet; thence North 02°09'20" West 106.16 feet; thence 
North 00°50'44M West 124.59 feet; thence North 05°25'21" East 12.29 feet; thence 
South 89°08'00" West 242.78 feet; thence North 06°15'00" West 64.00 feet; 
thence North 88°48'48M East 313.25 feet; thence North 0r44"48" East along a 





The following described land located in Utah County, State of Utah: 
Beginning at a point North 620.0 feet and East 1667.4 feet from the 
West quarter corner of Section 25, Township 6 South, Range 2 
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, thence North 76 feet; thence 
East 160 feet; thence South 136 feet; thence West 160 feet; thence 
North 60 feet to the point of beginning 
EXHIBIT "C" 
(Center Parcel) 
The following described land located in Utah County,,State of Utah: 
Beginning at a point on the corner on the East edge of Carterville 
Road and on the South edge of Hope Lane, which point is North 
884.66 feet and East 1,403.79 feet, more or less, from the West 
quarter corner of Section 25, Township 6 South, Range 2 East, Salt 
Lake Base and Meridian; thence South 84° 10 V£ East 100 feet 
along a hedge and fence on the South side of Hope Lane; thence 
South 3° 051 West 70 feet; thence North 84° 10 Vi West 100 feet to 
the East edge of Carterville Road; thence North 3° 05* East 70 feet 
along the East side of Carterville Road to the point of beginning. 
EXHIBIT "D" 
(Corner Parcel) 
The following described land located in Utah County, State of Utah: 
Commencing North 884.92 feet and East 1401.22 feet from the 
West one quarter corner of Section 25, Township 6 South, Range 2 
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North 03°05'00H East 
7.11 feet; thence South 84°10'30M East 323.18 feet; thence North 
41°57'00" East 61.04 feet; thence North 37°55W East 166.14 
feet; thence North 52°18'00" East 37.64 feet; thence North 
73°13'00" East 22.30 feet; thence South 405.26 feet; thence West 
89.74 feet; thence North 39.08 feet, thence West 160 feet; thence 
South 45.2 feet; thence North 36°26'00" West 92.31 feet; thence 
North 85°12'00" West 48.11 feet; thence South 64°03'00" West 
54.05 feet; thence South 74o46'30M West 130.92 feet; thence North 
03°05'00" East 141.21 feet; thence South 84o10"30" East 102.59 
feet; thence North" 03°05'00M East 70 feet; thence North 84°10'30M 
West 102.58 feet to the point of beginning. 
EXHIBIT "E" 
(North Parcel) 
l he following described land located in Utah County, State of Utah: 
Beginning at a point on the East side of the Carterville Road, 
which point is North 520.03 feet and East 1381.56 feet from the 
West quarter corner of Section 25, Township 6 South, Range 2 
East, Salt Lake Base & Meridian; thence North 3°05* East along 
fence and Carterville Road 151.25 feet; thence North 74° 46 W 
East 130.92 feet to the center line of an existing road; thence North 
64° 031 East 54.05 feet; thence South 85° 12' East 48.11 feet; 
thence South 36° 26* East 92.31 feet; thence leaving the center line 
of the existing road; thence South 90.80 feet; thence East 160.00 
feet; thence North 96.92 feet; thence East 157.74 feet; thence South 
16° 381 East 58.14 feet; thence South 6° 56* West 70.89 feet; thence 
South 24° 42' East 148.45 feet; thence North 82° 53* West 195.33 
feet along a fence; thence South 6° 16* West 41.96 feet along a 
fence; thence North 82° 42* West 305.94 feet along a fence; thence 
North 88° 03* West 33.77 feet along a fence to J. Theron Smith 
property; thence North 2° 12f East 90.00 feet along fence and said 
property line; thence North 85° 18' West along a fence and 
property line 142.00 feet to beginning and to the Carterville Road. 
EXHIBIT "F" 
(South Parcel) 
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A. Which is the one that's written out? 
Q. First page, 
A. Oh, my copy is not good enough to tell. I don't know. 
Q. You don't know of any practice she had to write out 
the dates in a different form every time? 
A. No, I do not. 
Q. And it is your testimony that all of the signatories 
on Exhibit 3 signed this document on June 1, 1977. 
A. I think you have asked that and I've answered that. 
MR. MCVEY: Go ahead and answer it, if you know. 
A. With the exception of my belief of having seen the 
Wentzes sign it on or about the 1st of June of 1977, I — what 
was your question again? 
Q. I'll ask it a different way. Did you see Exhibit 3, 
you yourself see Exhibit 3 fully executed in June of 1977. 
A. Yes. 




Q. Have you ever had possession of Sharon Peterson's 
Notary stamp. 
A. No. 
Q. Do you know whether Ashtons received any consideration 
for the easement document which is Exhibit 3. 
JENNIFER A. RUSSELL, CCR, RPR 60 
A, I understood that they received some nominal 
consideration. 
Q. Well, what consideration was given to them, if you 
know? 
A, I presume it was something like $10 or something. 
MR. ASHTON: How much was that? 
A. I presume it was something like $10 or $20. I don't 
know. 
Q. Do you have personal knowledge that a payment was made 
to Ashtons in the $10 to $20 range. 
A. No. 
Q. So it's just an assumption on your part? 
A. To my best recollection. 
Q. You yourself didn't give the Ashtons any money or a 
check; is that right? 
A. No. 
Q. Is that correct? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. Did the Ashtons receive anything other than the 
possibility of a nominal payment that you said you presume they 
received in return for the easement document Exhibit 3. 
A. Mr. Wentz took care of that and — 
Q. Do you know. 
A. Mr. Wentz took care of that. I don't know. 
Q. Did the Carters receive any payment for the easement 
JENNIFER A. RUSSELL, CCR, RPR 61 
document Exhibit 3? 
A. Same answer. Mr. Wentz took care of it. My best 
recollection is that they received some token. 
Q. But you yourself did not pay them anything. 
A. Not that I recall. I could possibly have but I don't 
recall that. 
Q. To your knowledge was anyone involved in the 
execution, notarization and signature of Exhibit 3 other than 
the Ashtons, the Carters, the Wentzes, Ms. Peterson and you. 
A. I don't know. 
Q. Do you know of anybody else? 
A. No. But I wasn't present, with the exception of 
Wentzes. 
Q. Are you aware of the existence of any documents other 
than Exhibit 3 itself that would evidence that Exhibit 3 was 
signed as it purports to have been signed in 1977. 
A. What do you mean by other documents? 
Q. Well, there might have been a letter from somebody to 
Ashton saying, gee whiz, why don't you consider giving us an 
easement, or there might have been a memorandum, there might 
have been a prior draft, there might have been all kinds of 
things. Are you aware of any kind of a document other than 
Exhibit 3 itself that would suggest or tend to prove that 
Exhibit 3 was signed in 1977. 
A. No. Mr. Wentz handled all that. 
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drives, they are usually parked on the race track, or near the 
race track. 
Q. What other acts do you claim constitute adverse 
possession of the property? 
A. Spraying the ornamental trees and the natural trees 
along the pond and the fence line about three or four times 
during May, June, and July. 
Q. Is that every year? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And who has done the spraying? 
A. That's been done by Stewart's Spray Control, by... 
The names are slipping me. There's a spray outfit from 
Springville whose name is -- I can't get off the tip of my 
mouth -- tongue right now. There have been three or four spray 
companies. I am not able to get the names off the top tip of my 
tongue. 
Q. So the one you know about is Stewart's Spray Control. 
Where is Stewart's Spray Control located? 
A. In Provo-Orem. 
Q. Now the trees that were sprayed by Stewart's Spray 
Control are located on the Sykes property, not the property you 
claim possession adversely; isn't that right? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. But how did the spray vehicles access the areas from 

































They would usually come in here and through here. 
So they drove over the race track area --
Yes, 
-- shown on Exhibit A; is that right? 
Yes. And then they would come through the -- come 
through the gate and spray the areas here that the trees are on 
this side 
! Q-
of the pond. 
What other acts -- excuse me. Over what period of 
time, between what years have — has the tree spraying been done J 










Virtually every year since 1975. 
And how long does it take on each occasion when the 
sprayed? 
How long does it take? 
Yes. 
Three or four hours. 
What other acts do you allege constitute adverse 
. of this property? J 
Cutting -- clearing the race track area and other 
areas, primarily the race track area, by chain saws and by 
bulldozers , stacking up the wood and burning it, and in making 




And over what period of time has that occurred? 
Since '75 or so. 



























A. There has been activity on that every year, yes. It 
has not been burned every year. 
Q. And how often has the burning occurred? 
A. I don't know, sometimes every two years, sometimes 
every six or eight years. 
Q. And how often does the tree cutting occur? 
A. Some sort of tree cutting I believe has happened most 
years. 
Q. Who did the tree cutting and burning? 
A. The part that was done with chain saws has been done 
by my family, my sons and myself, Shane Sykes, Clint Sykes, 
probably Scott Sykes, maybe Mark Sykes. And part of the -- part 
of it was done with bulldozers and front-end loaders that pushed 
it up into big piles. 
Q. Okay, I haven't asked you that question. 
A. I believe you did. 
Q. I asked you about tree cutting. Anybody commercial 
do the tree cutting or burning? 
A. No. Well, the bulldozers --
Q. Let's forget about the bulldozers. Tree cutting and 
burning. 
A. What? 
Q. Did anybody commercial do that? 
A. I don't know what you mean by commercial. I paid 































That's what I mean. Who? 
The same people that I mentioned with regard to the 
equipment. 










And who's done the bulldozing? 
The same people, the heavy-equipment operators. 
What other acts do you claim constitute adverse 
on this property? 
Right now there are my -- several burn piles are 
there's three, four, five, probably six burn piles 








You just told me about burning, didn't you? 
What? 
You just told me about burning, didn't you? 
About burn piles, yes. 
Is that something different? 
Well, they're there right now. 
Is this something different than what you've already 
told me about? 
A. 
Q. 
We have harvested wood -- I 
Just a minute, just a minute. Are the burn piles 
you're telling me that are there now different than the burn 






























piling and burning logs --
To the extent that the previous ones were burned up, 
there. To the extent that they are not burned up, 
they are there still. 
Q. It's the same activity, just a different period of 
time; is that right? 
A. I'm -- there -- burn piles have been very 















What other acts do you claim --
Removing wood for fireplace burning, hunting --
Just a second, just a second, just a second, let's 
removing the wood. Over -- between what years have 
wood? 
Oh, periodically from '75. 
And how periodically since '75? 
Once or twice a year. 
And who did the cutting and removing? 
Myself and my family. 
Ever pay anybody to do it? 
No. 
Why did you burn some on the disputed property and 
take some back to your house for firewood? 
A. 
things that 
Because we were instructed by counsel to do the 


























reason we took some of that wood off is to burn it in our 
fireplace. 
Q. Who is the counsel that advised you to do these 
things to perfect your adverse possession rights? 
A. Primarily Sherman Hibbert. And also -- his name will 
come to me in a second. The guy that's the councilman now. 
Q. And Sherman Hibbert told you you needed to burn some 
wood on the property --
A. No, he gave us a list of things to do to perfect 
adverse possession. 
Q. And when did he do that? 
A. In the early -- right when we first started, right 
after Mr. Ashton refused to proceed with this agreement. 
Q. So when Mr. Ashton refused to sell you his property, 
you decided you were going to get it by adverse possession; is 
that right? 
A. We first started to --
MR. McVEY: Well, he's just asking if, when Mr. 
Ashton refused to give you the property, that's when you decided 
to get it by adverse possession. 
A. Yes. 
Q. (By Mr. Maak) Okay, well, when did you decide you 
wanted to acquire ownership of the Ashton property by adverse 
possession? 
A. Because --
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